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Case No. 20140602-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

Plaintiff!Appellee,
V.

COOPER JOHN ANTHONY VAN HUIZEN,

Defendant/Appellant.

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from the juvenile court's decision under the Serious
Youth Offender Act (SYOA) to bind him over to district court on charges of
aggravated robbery, Utah Code Ann. §76-6-302, and aggravated burglary, Utah
Code Ann. §76-6-203, first degree felonies. This Court has jurisdiction under
Utah Code Ann. §78A-4-103(2)(c) (West Supp. 2014).

INTRODUCTION
Defendant, who was 16 years old, knowingly supplied guns for a homeinvasion robbery to steal drugs, and then participated in that robbery. After
analyzing the SYOA factors, the juvenile court bound him over for trial in
district court because of his age and the seriousness of his crimes. Defendant

"'°

challenges that ruling on several grounds.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. For the first time on appeal, Defendant argues that the 2013 SYOA
amendments made evidence about his rehabilitative potential and his mental
condition relevant considerations for the juvenile court.
Was Defendant's counsel ineffective for not arguing, or did the juvenile
court plainly err by not interpreting, the 2013 SYOA amendments as Defendant
now does?

Standard of Review. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims raised for the
first time on appeal are reviewed for correctness. State v. Isom, 2015 UT App
160, 134, 789 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. Plain error requires a showing of obvious,
prejudicial error. Id. 128.
2. Did the juvenile court clearly error in making its findings under the
SYOA factors, or did it abuse its discretion in concluding that Defendant had
not carried his burden to show that it should retain his case?

Standard of Review. Factual findings under the SYOA factors are reviewed
for clear error. In re M.E.P., 2005 UT App 227, 'lf15, 114 P.3d 596. Because the
juvenile court's ultimate decision involved a "best interests" determination
based on a weighing of factors, it should be reviewed for abuse of discretion.
See Doyle v. Doyle, 2011 UT 42, ,I40, 258 P.3d 553 (applying abuse of discretion
standard in child custody "best interests" determinations).

-2-
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3.

Was Defendant's trial counsel ineffective in arguing the evidence

before the juvenile court and in agreeing to allow the hearing to be held jointly
with a codefendant?

Standard of Review. See issue 1.
4. Was the juvenile court judge required to recuse herself sua sponte
because she was a former prosecutor and was married to the chief criminal
deputy in the prosecutor's office?

Standard of Review. See issue 1.

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
Addendum A contains:
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-701 (West Supp. 2013) (automatic waiver);
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702 (West Supp. 2013) (SYOA);
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-703 (West Supp. 2013) (certification);
Utah Code Ann. §78A-2-222 (West 2009) (disqualification);
Utah R. Juv. P. 22 (preliminary hearing in SYOA cases);
Utah R. Juv. P. 23A (SYOA hearings);
Utah R. Jud. Conduct 2.11 (disqualification).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Summary of facts.

Defendant supplies guns for, and participates in, a home-invasion robbery
Defendant and Joshua Dutson were good friends. R161,293-94. Dutson
introduced Defendant to Wesley Brown, Dexter Skinner, and Tomek Perkins.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law -3Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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R263,266,282-88,363. Brown, Skinner, and Perkins were all 18 years old; Dutson

was 17; Defendant was 16. R160-63,165,363.
The group had run out of marijuana and planned to get more by robbing
Christian Davidson. R237,282-88. Wesley Brown had previously lived with
Davidson and knew that he would have marijuana. R247-48,282-83. Brown
planned the robbery and the others, including Defendant, agreed to the plan.
R282-83 ,288,306-07.

The group first drove to Defendant's house and Defendant took two of
his father's guns.

R237,295.

The group then drove to Davidson's home.

R237,283.

Davidson was expecting a visit from friends when he heard a "loud
knock." R246-47. 1 He opened the door and found a stranger holding "a large
revolver." R247-49,251. Davidson tried to close the door, but the intruder put
his foot in the door and said, "Open the door, I'm going to pop (inaudible)."
R247,260. The intruder added, '"We're coming in,"' and commanded Davidson

to go downstairs.

R247.

The arn1ed inh·uder was Dexter Skinner.

R251.

Wesley Brown, Joshua Dutson, and Defendant followed Skinner into

An unbound copy of the juvenile court preliminary hearing h·anscript is
R240-401. The record contains a separate bound copy, but that copy did not
receive a record page number. Like Defendant, the State cites to the unbound,
record-paginated copy.
1

-4-
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0

Davidson's home while Tomek Perkins waited outside in a car. R276,278. The
intruders were armed with the two handguns Defendant had supplied and an
air-soft gun that looked like a real handgun. R283-84,302-03.
One of the intruders asked who else was home. R248. Davidson replied
that his mother was, but did not mention his friend Ryan Golding who was also
there. R248,264. Hearing a noise in the laundry room, Skinner tucked his pistol
into the waistband of his pants. R248,251. But when Golding emerged from the
laundry room, Skinner lifted his shirt to show him the butt of the gun.
R248,251-52. Apparently confused, Golding remarked that the gun was "cool,"
and reached to touch it, but Davidson warned his friend not to. R248,251-52.
Skinner then pulled the gun out of his waistband, pointed it at the ground, and
remarked, "Yeah, man, his body is on this." R252.
Skinner then

II

quickly" pointed the gun at Davidson's face and
II

demanded that Davidson give him everything." R248,252. Shocked, Davidson
"laughed" and said, "'Seriously, over pot?"' R252. Brown and a third intruder
then drew their guns. R252-53,310.
The evidence of who held the third gun was conflicting.
testified that Defendant did.

Davidson

R253. And Dutson wrote in his initial police

statement that Defendant had brandished a gun. R286-87. But in his police
interview, Dutson said that he, Brown, and Skinner were the only ones who
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held guns and that Defendant instead held a switchblade knife.

R284,287.

Defendant denied holding a gun or knife during the robbery. R299.
With their guns drawn, the intruders told Davidson to "get everything"
he had and "lay on the floor." R254. When Davidson said he only had the
"tiny" bag of "weed" on the table, Skinner remarked that he had seen Davidson
slip a larger bag of marijuana into his pocket. R254. Davidson surrendered the
larger bag. R254.
Skinner then directed someone to take Davidson's wallet and phone.
R254. Davidson testified that he did not see who took them. R254-55. During
an earlier photo lineup, however, Davidson identified Defendant as the person
who took them. R311-12.
Ryan Golding, Davidson's friend, told police that the intruders ordered
him and Davidson to the ground and stole their phones and money. R264-65.
Golding also reported that the intruders threatened to kill him and Davidson if
they tried to interfere or report the crimes. R265.
One of the intruders told Davidson to stay on the floor and Brown, who
II

had previously lived with Davidson, said he was going to pay" Davidson's
mother a visit." R255. The others "rushed" up the stairs and out of the house.
II

R255.

Meanwhile, Brown pointed his gun at Davidson, hesitated, and

mentioned an earlier altercation between the two when they had briefly lived
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together. R255. Davidson feared for his life. R255. Luckily, however, Brown
ultimately fled.

R255.

After the robbery, the group shared the stolen

marijuana. R288.
Davidson's mother reported the crimes. R263-64. When police initially
approached Davidson and Golding, Golding fled but was quickly apprehended
and told police what happened. R264.
Defendant ad1nitted to police that he supplied the two real guns used in
the robbery.

R295-96.

He took them from his father's gun safe.

R296.

Defendant also admitted that he entered Davidson's home with the rest of the
intruders. R294-95.

Defendant's text messages discussing armed robbery
Police searched Defendant's cellphone but could not retrieve any text
messages from it. R267,305. A search of Dutson's cellphone, however, revealed
his text-message conversations with both Defendant and Skinner.

R267-68;

State's Exhibit #1 (SEl) (Addendmn G is the texts verbatim). 2
The evening before the robbery, Dutson asked Defendant in a text if he
wanted to participate in a robbery and promised Defendant "a cut of it."
R268;SE1. Defendant replied "for sure," and said he had to get his gun back
from "anddrew." R268;SE1. Dutson then said he "was kidding," but quickly

2

State's Exhibit 1 is in the juvenile court's pleadings files.
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retracted that statement and texted that he was not kidding. R268;SE1. When
Defendant replied that he was confused, Dutson explained that Defendant
could participate in the robbery as long as he kept it a secret: "you can be apart
II

[sic] of it but you gotta keep it on the down low" and h ust no nigga." R2684

69;SE1.
When Defendant then asked about leaving "early," Dutson replied,
"Yeah ... so we can get the lick." R269-70;SE1. "Lick" is a slang term for a
robbery or a robbery victim. R270,272. Thus, to "hit up a lick is to ... rob
somebody." R272,305-06.
Dutson had a simultaneous text conversation with Skinner discussing the
upcoming robbery. R269-70;SE1. Skinner told Dutson "[t]omorrow we grab
them straps and hit up niggas." R269;SE1. "Strap" is a slang term for a gun.

See www.urbandictionary.com/ define.php?term=strap; see also Br.Aplt. 7
(recognizing that the "straps" Skinner referred to

II

were apparently

[Defendant's] father's guns").
The day after the robbery, Dutson asked Defendant in a text if he wanted
to participate in another robbery ("hit up a lick"). R271;SE1. Defendant replied
"Maybe." R271;SE1. Dutson initially said the robbery would involve "[t]he
little white boys we hit up," but followed up with "Hahah." R271;SE1. When
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Defendant asked about "hitting them again" Dutson responded, "Jk Haha
Imhigh." R272;SE1. "Jk" is an abbreviation for "just kidding." R272.

B.

Summary of proceedings.
The State charged Defendant under the SYOA in the juvenile court with

two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated burglary, all
first degree felonies.

JRl-3. 3 The juvenile court found that the State had

established probable cause that Defendant had committed those crimes and that
Defendant had not carried his burden to show that the juvenile court should
retain his case. JR.28-31. It therefore bound him over to district court. JR31.
Defendant did not appeal that final order.
Defendant pled guilty in district court to two reduced counts of robbery,
second degree felonies.

R16-21.

The court sentenced him to 1-15 years in

prison. R52-53.
Defendant obtained new counsel and moved to quash the juvenile court's
bindover order and to reinstate his right to appeal that order. R93-101,414-34.
The district court denied the motion to quash because it lacked jurisdiction to
consider it. R587-89 (Addendun1 Fis a copy of the ruling). The district court
granted Defendant's motion to reinstate his right to appeal the bindover order,
however, after Defendant alleged that his trial counsel was ineffective for not
The State cites the juvenile court record as "JR" and the district court
record as "R."
3
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notifying him of his right to appeal the order or the deadline for doing so, and
after the State stipulated to Defendant's motion. R589-91,612 (Add. F).
Defendant timely appeals. R599.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
I. Defendant argues that the 2013 SYOA amendments made his mental
condition and his amenability to rehabilitation using juvenile court resources
relevant to the juvenile court's bindover decision. He argues that his counsel
was ineffective for not arguing these factors and presenting evidence to support
them, and that the juvenile court plainly erred for not sua sponte considering
these factors and requiring a psychological evaluation of Defendant.
Defendant has not shown that his trial counsel or the juvenile court erred,
because he misinterprets 2013 SYOA amendments. Those amendments did not
make a defendant's rehabilitative potential or mental condition relevant,
because the amendments did not include those considerations in the exclusive
list of factors that a juvenile court may consider in making a SYOA
determination. By including those factors in the related certification statute, but
excluding them from the SYOA, the legislature made it clear that those factors
were not relevant to SYOA detern1inations. The fact that 2015 amend1nents
added rehabilitative potential to the SYOA factors further supports the
conclusion that the 2013 amendments did not include that consideration.
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But even if rehabilitative potential and mental condition were arguably
relevant considerations under the 2013 SYOA amendments, that fact would not
have been so obvious that trial counsel was ineffective, or the trial court plainly
erred, for not recognizing it.
In any event, Defendant cannot show the prejudice required for either
claim. The juvenile court considered his rehabilitative potential and found it
unpersuasive.

And Defendant's newly proffered psychological evaluation

would not have likely convinced the juvenile court to retain his case, because
the evaluation did not undermine the findings that Defendant facilitated violent
crimes by providing guns to his friends and then participated in those crimes.
Those findings were the primary reasons for the juvenile court's decision.
II. Defendant argues that the juvenile court misapplied the SYOA to the
facts and erroneously concluded that he had not carried his heavy burden to
show that it should retain his case. But Defendant does not even allege, let
alone demonsh·ate, that any of the juvenile court's factual findings were clearly
erroneous. Those findings established that he knowingly facilitated violent
crhnes by providing guns to his friends and participated in those crimes.
Given those findings, Defendant has not shown that the juvenile court
abused its discretion in concluding that he did not prove by clear and
convincing evidence that it should retain his case. This Court should review the
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juvenile court's order only for abuse of discretion because that order required a
"best interests" determination based on a weighing of various factors by a court
with specialized experience in dealing with juveniles.
III. Defendant argues that his trial counsel was ineffective in arguing the
various pieces of evidence in the juvenile court and for allowing Defendant's
hearing to proceed jointly with a codefendant's hearing. The fact that trial
counsel did not argue the evidence as Defendant's appellate counsel would
have does not show that trial counsel was deficient. The record also discloses a
reasonable tactical basis for holding a joint hearing where the juvenile court was
required to compare Defendant's culpability with that of his codefendant, and
the evidence showed that Defendant was less involved at the crime scene.
Regardless, Defendant has not shown prejudice where none of his new
arguments would have undermined his admissions that he facilitated violent
crimes by providing guns and participated in those crimes, and none of the
allegedly inadmissible evidence that he now identifies affected the juvenile
court's decision.
IV.

Defendant argues that the juvenile court plainly erred by not sua

sponte recusing herself where (1) she was married to a supervising prosecutor
in the office prosecuting Defendant and (2) the judge was a former prosecutor.
But no controlling authority plainly established that the judge's marriage to a
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prosecutor who was not involved in the case required recusal. Controlling
authority did establish, however, that the judge's former employment as a
prosecutor did not require recusal. Moreover, Defendant has not alleged, let
alone demonstrated, that the judge was actually biased. Thus, Defendant has
not shown that the juvenile court plainly erred by not sua sponte recusing
herself.

ARGUMENT
I.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR NOT ARGUING, OR THAT THE JUVENILE COURT
PLAINLY ERRED BY NOT SUA SPONTE ADOPTING, HIS INCORRECT
INTERPRETATION OF THE 2013 SYOA AMENDMENTS

In his Point I(A)-(C), Defendant argues that his trial counsel was
ineffective for not: (1) arguing that the 2013 SYOA amendments required the
juvenile court to consider his potential for rehabilitation in the juvenile system,
and (2) providing the court with a psychological evaluation of Defendant,
expert testimony from the evaluator, and psychological studies and caselaw
generally addressing juvenile psychological development. Br.Aplt. 15-24. In
his Point II, Defendant argues that the juvenile court plainly erred by not
interpreting the 2013 SYOA an1endn1ents to require consideration of
Defendant's rehabilitative potential and mental condition. Br.Aplt. 31-44.
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Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective, or that the
juvenile court plainly erred, because he is the one who misinterprets the 2013
SYOA amendments.

The amendments did not 1nake a defendant's

rehabilitative potential or mental condition relevant factors.
A. While the legislature has determined that most juvenile
offenders should be adjudicated in juvenile court, it has created a
statutory presumption in favor of trying the oldest juveniles who
commit the most serious crimes in adult court.

The people of Utah, through their elected representatives, have
determined that while most juvenile offenders should be adjudicated in the
juvenile court, the adult system is usually better equipped to address older
juveniles who commit the most serious crimes.

The statutory scheme

nevertheless grants juvenile courts discretion to retain some older juveniles
who commit serious crimes. This discretion increases as the juvenile's age and
seriousness of his crime decreases.
II

The legislature has given juvenile courts exclusive original jurisdiction
1n proceedings concerning" most minors and those under 21 who have
11

violated any law or ordinance before becoming 18 years of age." Utah Code

Ann. §78A-6-103(1)(a) (West Supp. 2013). The chief purpose of Utah's juvenile
II

justice systen1 is to ensure public safety and individual accountability" by
II

imposing appropriate sanctions" on juvenile offenders. Utah Code Ann. §78A6-102(5)(a) (West 2009).
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Because juveniles generally commit less serious cnmes and are less
responsible than adults, the legislature has equipped juvenile courts to provide
a broad array of services, but a limited array of criminal-like sanctions. See State

v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, if 16, 63 P.3d 667 (recognizing that juvenile offenders
11

are still in their formative years"); Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-117 (West Supp.

2013) (listing juvenile court services and sanctions). Juvenile court sanctions
II

focus primarily on the education, rehabilitation, and treatment of minors."

Schofield, 2002 UT 132,
offender

II

if 16.

Thus, while a juvenile court can adjudicate an

delinquent," it cannot impose a criminal conviction that will be

reflected in a permanent criminal record. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-116(1) to
(3) (West Supp. 2014); Schofield, 2002 UT 132, ,I16. And while a juvenile court
can detain a youth offender if the need for public safety and individual
accountability warrants it, it can do so only until the offender turns 21. Utah
Code Ann. §§62A-7-404(1) (West 2012); 78A-6-117(d); 78A-6-120.
Given a juvenile court's limited jurisdiction and array of sanctions, the
juvenile syste1n is ill-equipped to deal with older offenders who commit the
most serious crimes.

The legislature therefore enacted three interrelated

statutes to address these offenders: sections 701, 702, and 703 of the Juvenile
Court Act. See Utah Code Ann. §§78A-6-701 to -703 (West Supp. 2013).
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The first statute-previously called the "direct-file" statute but more
correctly termed the "automatic waiver" statute- applies to 16- or 17-year-olds
who commit murder or aggravated murder. See Utah Code Am1. §78A-6-701
(West Supp. 2013); State v. Angilau, 2011 UT 3,

iJl n.1, 245 P.3d 745. This statute

automatically waives juvenile court jurisdiction over these offenders and vests
jurisdiction exclusively in the district court. See id.
The second statute, the SYOA, applies to 16- or 17-year-olds who commit
one of nine "inherently violent and aggressive offenses," such as aggravated
robbery or burglary.

See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702 (West Supp. 2013);

Housekeeper v. State, 2008 UT 78, iJ7, 197 P.3d 636 (quotation and citation
omitted). The SYOA creates "a strong presumption" that such offenders will be
tried in the district court.

See Housekeeper, 2008 UT 78, iJ7 (quotation and

citation omitted).
Under the SYOA, a prosecutor files a criminal information in juvenile
court charging an enumerated offense. Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(1) (West
Supp. 2013). The prosecutor then has the burden to show probable cause that
the defendant com1nitted that offense. Id. §78A-6-702(3)(a). If the prosecutor
carries that burden, the juvenile court "shall order that the defendant be bound
over and held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult,"
unless the offender can successfully carry a "heavy burden" to show that the
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juvenile court should retain him. Id. §78A-6-702(3)(b); In re F.L.R., 2006 UT App
294, ,I4, 141 P.3d 601.

When the juvenile court heard Defendant's case in 2013, the SYOA
allowed the juvenile court to retain Defendant's case only if he showed by
11

II

clear and convincing evidence" that it would be contrary to the best interest

of the minor and to the public" to bind him over to the district court. Id. §78A6-702(3)(b) & (d). In evaluating whether Defendant had made that showing, the
II

SYOA limited the juvenile court to considering only the following" factors:
(i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent
for an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which
would be a felony if committed by an ad ult;
(ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons,
whether the minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of
culpability than the codefendants;
(iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was
committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner;
(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in
the juvenile court; and
(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the
minor in the juvenile court or in the district court.
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c).
The third statute, known as the certification statute, applies to youth
offenders under 16 who commit serious crimes. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6703 (West Supp. 2013).

This statute allows a prosecutor to file a criminal
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information charging a minor 14 or older with any crime that would be a felony

if committed by an adult, and ask that the juvenile court certify the offender to
district court. Id. §§78A-6-602(3); 78A-6-703(1). The prosecutor then has the
burden of showing both: (1) probable cause that the juvenile committed the
charged offense; and (2) "by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be
contrary to the best interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court
to retain jurisdiction." Id. §78A-6-703(2).
In making this second determination, the certification statute requires a
juvenile court to consider ten factors, and allows the court to base its finding on
any one or more of those factors. Id. §78A-6-703(3). The statute also allows the
court to consider "[w]ritten reports and other materials relating to the minor's
mental, physical, educational, and social history." Id. §78A-6-703(5)(a).
Thus, the SYOA creates a presumption in favor of district court and limits
the factors that a juvenile court n1ay consider in deciding whether the offender
has shown that retention is appropriate. The certification statute, which deals
with younger offenders, creates a presumption in favor of juvenile court and
enlarges the factors and evidence that a court may consider in deciding whether
the prosecution has shown that certification is appropriate.
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B.

The juvenile court bound Defendant over to district court
because he knowingly supplied guns for a home-invasion
robbery, participated in that robbery, and was 16 years old.

The juvenile court here found that Defendant had not rebutted the
SYOA' s presumption that he should be tried in district court. The court first
found probable cause that Defendant committed two counts of aggravated
robbery and one count of aggravated burglary. JR28 (Addendum D is the
co\].rt' s written order and Addendum E is the court's oral ruling). Defendant
does not challenge those findings.
The juvenile court then considered whether Defendant had shown "by
clear and convincing evidence that it would be contrary to the best interest of
the minor and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the
jurisdiction of the district court," based on the five statutory factors detailed
above.

See Utah Code Ann. §§78A-6-702(3)(c), (d) & (e); JR28-31.

After

analyzing each factor, the court concluded that he had not. JR.31.
As to the first factor-whether Defendant had any prior dangerousweapon offenses in juvenile court-the prosecutor stipulated, and the juvenile
court found, that Defendant had "no prior record in juvenile court." JR28;R32021,362,371.
The court then compared Defendant's culpability to that of his
codefendants and found" that his culpability was significant." JR29. The court
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initially found that Defendant's "involvement was less at the scene of the crime
than others," because there was insufficient evidence to show "that he
brandished a gun or switchblade knife." JR29.
The

court

nevertheless

found

Defendant's

relative

culpability

"significant" because he "provided the guns" used in the crimes and did so
"knowing they would be used in the burglary and robberies." JR29. The court
noted that Defendant's "assistance in the robbery ensured that the other
codefendant's would have guns to use when breaking into the home and
robbing the persons therein." JR29. The court also found that Defendant was
"present and assisted in the forced entrance into the home." JR29.
Under the third factor, the court found that Defendant's "role 1n the
offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner,"
primarily because he knowingly supplied the guns. JR29. The court found that
the crimes were planned "over a period of time" and were not "a spur of the
moment decision."

JR29-30.

The court also found that Defendant and his

cohorts "forced their way at gun point into one of the most protected and
sacred areas in our society, the home." JR29. The court further found that
although Defendant did not wield a weapon, his "presence in the home, by
itself, was a threat to the victims and to others who were in or could have come
into the home." JR30.
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Regarding the fourth factor-prior adjudications in juvenile court- the
court restated that this was Defendant's first offense. JR30.
Finally, regarding the fifth factor, the court found several reasons that
public safety would be best served by sending Defendant to district court:
• Defendant was already 16 and the court would have jurisdiction over
him only until he reached 21, while the district court's jurisdiction was
unlimited;
• the offenses were "among the most serious in our community" because
they involved "drugs, violence, firearms, and forcing entry into a home to
commit robberies";
• the crimes involved "acts of aggression" in a home and therefore
presented a significant "likelihood of harm to others," including law
enforcement and other members of the public;
• "[p ]ublic safety requires a strong response and longer correctional period
than is available in the juvenile court" given the seriousness of the crimes;
and
e

a strong response was necessary because, although Defendant "provided
evidence of a loving family and good home," Defendant nevertheless
"chose to engage in violent and irresponsible acts that put the safety of
members of the public at grave risk."

JR30.
Regarding the ultimate inquiry, the juvenile court found that although
Defendant had shown that retention was in his best interest, he had not shown
by clear and convincing evidence that retention was also in the public's best
interest. JR31. Regarding Defendant's best interests, the court recognized that
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"[t]here are more rehabilitative services ... available in the juvenile system than
in the adult system." R374-75. But because Defendant had not shown that
retention was in the public's best interest, the court bound Defendant over to
the district court. JR31.
C. The 2013 SYOA amendments did not make a defendant's
or mental condition relevant
rehabilitative potential
considerations.
Defendant argues that the 2013 amendments allowed juvenile courts to
consider a youth offender's potential for rehabilitation using juvenile court
resources, and his individual mental condition. Br.Aplt.16-24, 38-41. Relying
entirely on the legislative history of the 2013 amendments, rather than on the
actual statutory language, Defendant argues that the amendments vvere
intended to "reduce the number of juveniles" transferred to the adult system
"without first exhausting the resources of the juvenile system." Br.Aplt.17-19.
Defendant also argues that the amendments increased the scope of
relevant evidence at a serious youth offender preliminary hearing to include
information about the juvenile's mental condition, his amenability to
rehabilitation in the juvenile system, and evidence that juveni~es who are
sentenced in the adult system generally have a higher recidivism rate. Br.Aplt.
16-24.

He contends that evidence about his "stage of development [and]

intellectual and emotional functioning" in the form of a psychological
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evaluation "was key to the court's accurate assessment of the retention factors."
Br.Aplt. 20, 24.

He proffers a psychological evaluation that his appellate

counsel obtained after Defendant pled guilty and was sentenced.

R406.

Defendant reasons that had the juvenile court understood the statute in this
light and received evidence about his rehabilitative potential and mental
condition in the form of a psychological evaluation, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the juvenile court would have struck the balance in favor of
retaining his case. Br.Aplt. 16-24, 31-43.
The 2013 SYOA amendments did give juvenile courts greater discretion
in determining whether to retain charged offenders. But the amendments did
not make rehabilitative potential or a defendant's mental condition relevant
considerations.
Before 2013, the SYOA gave juvenile courts only limited discretion to
retain offenders because it included only three retention factors and made those
factors determinative, rather than considerations in a larger "best interests"
determination. If the prosecution established probable cause that the defendant
had committed an enun1erated crin1e, then the Act required the court to bind
the defendant over to the district court unless the defendant proved the three
retention factors by clear and convincing evidence. Utah Code Ann. §78A-6107(3) (West Supp. 2012).

These three factors are essentially the first three
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factors in the amended statute. The Defendant had to show that: (1) he had no
prior adjudications for a dangerous-weapon offense that would have been a
felony if committed by an adult; (2) he had a lesser degree of culpability if the
offense was committed with others; and (3) his role in the offense was not
violent, aggressive, or premeditated.

See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c)

(West Supp. 2012).
The 2013 amendments retained much of the prior statute. As explained, a
juvenile court must still bind a defendant over to district court upon a finding
of probable cause, absent a showing that retention is appropriate. See Utah
Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(b) (Addendum Bis the enrolled copy of H.B. 105, the
2013 amendments). The amendments also leave the burden on the defendant to
satisfy the retention standard "by clear and convincing evidence."

See id.
~

§§78A-6-702(3)(d) & (e).
But two features of the 2013 amendments granted juvenile courts greater
discretion to retain serious youth offenders. First, the amendments allowed the
juvenile court to consider two more factors:
(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in
the juvenile court; and
(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the
minor in the juvenile court or in the district court.
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c)(iv) & (v).
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Second, and most significantly, the amendments changed the test for
determining whether retention was appropriate. Rather than making that test
dependent on the offender's ability to prove each of the factors, the
amendments designated those factors as the exclusive components of a
determination based on a weighing of the "best interests" of the offender and
the public. See id. §78A-6-702(3).
But the plain language of the 2013 amendments shows that they did not
modify the SYOA to the extent that Defendant now claims.

Although the

legislature increased a juvenile court's discretion by adding the "best interest"
determination, the legislature limited that discretion to considering" only" the
five factors in subsection (c) in making that determination. Id. §78A-6-702(3)(c).
Amended subsection (d) reiterated that the "best interest" determination must
be made "in light of the [five] considerations listed in Subsection (3)(c)." Id.
§78A-6-702(3) (d).
None of the five factors that a juvenile court must consider include a
youth offender's mental condition or amenability to rehabilitation in the
juvenile syste1n. Id. §78A-6-702(c). Nor do those factors include evidence that
1ninors generally lack emotional n1aturity or evidence of the recidivism rates for
minors incarcerated in the adult system. Id. Thus, the plain language of the
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statute did not allow the juvenile court to consider the additional factors and
evidence that Defendant now proffers.
The certification statute further demonstrates that the legislature did not
intend the juvenile court to consider Defendant's potential for rehabilitation or
mental condition in making a determination under the SYOA.

When

construing the SYOA, this Court must "interpret its provisions in harmony with
other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters," like the certification
statute. See State in Interest of A. T., 2015 UT 41,

if16, 783 Utah Adv. Rep. 22

(quotation and citation omitted).
As mentioned, the certification statute lists ten factors that a juvenile
court must consider in deciding whether to certify and offender to district court.
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-703(3). Those factors include:
"(e) the maturity of the minor as determined by consideration of
the minor's home, environment, emotional attitude, and
pattern of living;" and
"(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities
available to the juvenile court."
Utah Code Ann. §§78A-6-703(3)(e) & (g). The certification statute also allows a
juvenile court to consider [w]ritten reports and other materials relating to the
minor's mental, physical, educational, and social history." Id. §78A-6-703(5)(a).
By including these factors and evidence supporting them in the certification
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statute, but omitting them from the SYOA, the legislature underscored its intent
that juvenile courts not consider these factors and evidence under the SYOA.
This Court confirmed this conclusion in In re A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1097-98
(Utah App. 1997). Like Defendant here, A.B. argued that the legislative history
of the SYOA indicated "that the Legislature intended to apply adult sanctions
only to juvenile offenders unamenable to rehabilitation in the juvenile system."

Id. at 1096. This Court disagreed however, noting that the plain language of the
SYOA did not include consideration of an offender's potential for rehabilitation,
while the related certification statute did. Id. at 1097-98. This Court therefore
explained that "the Utah Legislature clearly knew how to make rehabilitation a
consideration in determining whether to waive jurisdiction over a youth
offender; had the Legislature intended it to be considered in the serious youth
offender statute, the Legislature would have so stated." Id. at 1098. The court
further explained that the "isolated remarks" of a few legislators could not
"trump the plain language and context of the statute," which did not include
consideration of an offenders rehabilitative potential. Id.
Like A.B., Defendant also relies on statements from the bill's sponsors to
support his interpretation of the 2013 amendments. Br.Aplt. 17-18. Some of
those remarks do mention the rehabilitative services available in juvenile court.
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But as in A.B., those remarks cannot "trump the plain language and context of
the statute." 936 P.2d at 1098.
Defendant contends that evidence about his rehabilitative potential and
mental condition is relevant to considerations of public safety, one of the listed
factors. Br.Aplt. 17-19. He argues that "public safety interests coincide with the
juvenile's interests in retaining juveniles in the juvenile courts" because youth
offenders who stay in the juvenile system are more likely to be rehabilitated,
while those treated as adults are more likely to reoffend. Br.Aplt. 18.
Defendant may well be correct that the juvenile system is generally more
effective in rehabilitating most youth offenders than the adult system. And he
may also be correct that, generally speaking, it would be good policy to
consider a youthful offender's rehabilitative potential. But that does not mean
that the legislature intended juvenile courts to consider a juvenile's likelihood
of rehabilitation and mental condition as factors under the 2013 SYOA. Rather,
the statutory language evidences a reasonable policy decision that when the
oldest 1ninors commit the most serious crimes, public safety is best served by
e1nphasizing accountability and punishment over rehabilitation. Indeed, the
SYOA applies only to 16-or 17-year-olds who commit one of nine "inherently
violent and aggressive offenses." Housekeeper, 2008 UT 78, ,I7.
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This Court has repeatedly recognized the reasonableness of this policy
decision. See In re A.B., 936 P.2d at 1097-99; In re M.E.P., 2005 UT App 227, ,I14
n.4, 114 P.3d 596. In M.E.P., this Court acknowledged that while the SYOA's
; ..,;,

YI'

presumption in favor of the adult system "may, at times, thrust juveniles who
would benefit from the rehabilitative nature of the juvenile system into the
world of adult criminal sanctions, it implements the legislative goals of
emphasizing public safety, accountability, and punishment for certain violent
juvenile offenders, with a lesser goal of rehabilitation." 2005 UT App 227, if14
n.4.
Defendant argues that the 2013 amendments undermine A.B. Br.Aplt. 18.
But as explained, the 2013 amendments did not add a juvenile's rehabilitative
potential or mental condition to the list of factors in the SYOA. Rather, those
amendments expressly state that a SYOA determination is to be based "only"
on the listed factors. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c). A.B. therefore still
controls.
Finally, the 2015 amendments to the SYOA settle any doubt about the
relevancy of an offender's rehabilitative potential and mental condition.
Effective May 2015, the legislature ainended the SYOA' s fifth factor to include
an offender's rehabilitative potential as a consideration.

As amended, the

statute now reads that a juvenile court "shall consider only the following:
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(v) whether public safety and the interests of the minor are better
served by adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in the
district court, including whether the resources of the adult system or
juvenile system are m.ore likely to assist in rehabilitating the minor and
reducing the threat which the minor presents to the public.
Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c)(v) (West Supp. 2015) (emphasis added)
(Addendum C is an enrolled copy of S.B. 167, the 2015 amendments). Thus, the
legislature did not include a juvenile's rehabilitative potential as a relevant
consideration under the SYOA until 2015.
Whether previous versions of the SYOA were well-crafted or furthered
good policy is not at issue. Rather, the issue is the scope of what the SYOA
allowed the juvenile court to consider at Defendant's hearing. As the plain
language of the then-effective SYOA, the language of the certification statute,
the holding in A.B., and the 2015 SYOA amendments all demonstrate, the SYOA
did not allow the juvenile court to consider Defendant's mental condition or his
amenability to rehabilitation in the juvenile system. See Utah Code Ann. §78A6-702(3)(c).
D. Because Defendant misinterprets the SYOA, he has not shown
that his trial counsel was ineffective, or that the juvenile court
plainly erred, in interpreting the statute.

As mentioned, Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective for
not (1) asking the juvenile court to consider his rehabilitative potential using
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juvenile court services, and (2) presenting evidence of his rehabilitative
potential in the form of a psychological evaluation and research and caselaw on
the mental condition of juveniles generally. Br.Aplt. 20-24. Defendant also
argues that the juvenile court plainly erred by not sua sponte considering his
rehabilitative potential, the "reformative benefits available to [him] in the
juvenile court," and requiring "a professional evaluation" of his mental
condition. Br.Aplt. 38-42. Defendant has not shown, however, that his counsel
was ineffective or that the juvenile court plainly erred, because his arguments
are all based on his misinterpretation of the 2013 SYOA amendments.
To prove that his counsel was ineffective, Defendant must show that his
counsel's performance was deficient and that the deficient performance
prejudiced him. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 691-94 (1984).
Counsel performs deficiently only when his actions "f[a]ll below an objective
standard of reasonableness" as measured by the "prevailing professional
norms." Id. 688; Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 521 (2003). Prejudice results
only when there is "' a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."'

Id. at 694.
To prove that the juvenile court plainly erred, Defendant must show that
the court committed an error that was both obvious and prejudicial. State v.
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Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 28, 789 Utah Adv. Rep. 21. An error is obvious if it
11

contravenes settled appellate law or the plain language of the relevant

statute."

Id. (quotations and citations omitted). "An error is prejudicial if

absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome
for the appellant." Id. (quotation and citation omitted).
As explained, the 2013 amendments did not allow the juvenile court to
consider Defendant's rehabilitative potential or mental condition. Because none
of this evidence was relevant under the statute, Defendant cannot show that his
counsel acted unreasonably when he did not present it. Nor can Defendant
show that the trial court plainly erred by not considering it.
But even if this evidence were arguably relevant under the 2013
amendments, Defendant still could not show that his counsel performed
11

deficiently. To be objectively unreasonable, trial counsel's error must be so
egregious that no reasonably competent attorney would have acted similarly."

Harvey v. Warden, Union Corr. Inst., 629 F.3d 1228, 1239 (11th Cir. 2011) (citing
Wood v. Allen, 542 F.3d 1281, 1309 (11th Cir. 2008)); see also Rompilla v. Beard, 545
U.S. 374, 389 (2005) (counsel's perforn1ance was objectively umeasonable
because "[n]o reasonable lawyer" would have acted as counsel did); State v.

Larrabee, 2013 UT 70, if 53, 321 P.3d 1136 (forgoing an objection would be
objectively umeasonable only where "no reasonable defense lawyer" would do
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so); State v. Curtis, 2013 UT App 287, 135, 317 P.3d 968 (no showing of deficient
performance where defendant failed to show that evidence was so compelling
"that no reasonable attorney would have failed to introduce it").
Defendant has not shown that all reasonable attorneys would have
interpreted the 2013 SYOA amendments as making a juvenile's rehabilitative
potential and mental condition relevant.

As explained, controlling caselaw

established that by excluding rehabilitative potential from an earlier version of
the SYOA, but including it in the certification statute, the legislature clearly
signaled its intent to exclude this consideration from SYOA determinations. See

In re A.B., 936 P.2d at 1097-98. The 2013 amendments did not explicitly add
rehabilitative potential to the exclusive list of SYOA factors.

Nor did any

caselaw establish that the amendments made rehabilitative potential relevant.
Thus, even if the amendments arguably made rehabilitative potential relevant,
that result was not so obvious that Defendant's trial counsel was objectively
unreasonable for not recognizing it.
For these same reasons, Defendant cannot show that the juvenile court
plainly erred.

Neither the plain language of the amendments, nor any

controlling caselaw, established that rehabilitative potential and mental
condition were relevant factors.

Thus, any error in interpreting the

amendments not to include these considerations could not have been obvious.
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See Isom, 2015 UT App 160, ,I28 (" obvious" error contravenes settled appellate
law or plain statutory language).
E.

Defendant has not shown prejudice, because the juvenile court
considered his rehabilitative potential, and a psychological
evaluation would not have likely made a difference.

Even if Defendant could show deficient performance or obvious error, he
cannot shown that he was prejudiced. The ineffective assistance of counsel and
plain error standards share a "cmnmon standard" of prejudice.

State v.

Litherland, 2000 UT 76, if31 n.14, 12 P.3d 92. "Under either theory, a defendant
must demonstrate that, absent the error or deficient performance, 'there is a
reasonable probability of a more favorable result."' State v. McNeil, 2013 UT
App 134, ~42, 302 P.3d 844 (quoting State v. King, 2010 UT App 396, ,I 20, 248
P.3d 984). Defendant has not made that showing.
Defendant has not shown that any lack of evidence or argument
regarding his rehabilitative potential prejudiced him because the juvenile court
not only heard evidence and argument on that issue, but it also considered it
and found that it would be in his best interests to remain in juvenile court.
Defendant's father testified that he believed it would be in Defendant's best
interest to stay in juvenile court, where he would have an opportunity for
rehabilitation, because Defendant was "a motivated child." R349. Defendant's
mother likewise testified that she believed Defendant was "fully rehabilitatable
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and reformable." R353. And Defendant's trial counsel argued that Defendant
could be rehabilitated in the juvenile system. R361-62,369-70.
Even though the SYOA did not allow the juvenile court to consider
Defendant's rehabilitative potential, the juvenile court nevertheless considered
it. R374-75. As explained, the juvenile court recognized that" [t]here are more
rehabilitative services . . . available in the juvenile system than in the adult
system." R374-75. The court therefore found that Defendant had shown that it
was in his best interests to stay in juvenile court. JR31. As explained, however,
the juvenile court nevertheless bound Defendant over to district court because
he had not shown that keeping him in juvenile court was in the public's best
interest. JR31.
The juvenile court made its decision after rece1vmg and considering
evidence about Defendant's rehabilitative potential. Defendant therefore has
not shown that he was prejudiced by any lack of evidence or argument on that
consideration.
Nor has Defendant shown that the lack of a psychological evaluation
prejudiced him. The juvenile court bound Defendant over to district court
because it was concerned that he knowingly facilitated violent crimes by
providing guns, he participated in those crimes, and, at 16, he would be under
its jurisdiction for only a limited time. JR28-31. The psychological evaluation
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that Defendant now proffers does not undermine any of those facts. R406-413.
Rather, it confirms that Defendant's description of the crimes "was generally
consistent" with the information in the police reports, witness statements,
suspect statements, and charging documents.

R406,411.

The evaluation

attempts to explain why Defendant should be viewed as less culpable despite
his participation. R406-13. But Defendant has not shown that the evaluation
would have likely made a difference given the juvenile court's focus on
Defendant's age and on his facilitation of, and participation in, violent crimes.
JR28-31.

Because the psychological evaluation did not refute or even

undermine those facts, Defendant has not shown that it likely would have made
a difference.
II.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE JUVENILE COURT ABUSED
ITS DISCRETION IN BINDING HIM OVER TO DISTRICT COURT

Defendant also argues in his Point II that the juvenile court misapplied
the SYOA factors to the evidence and erroneously found that he had not carried
his burden to rebut the presumption that he should be bound over to district
court. Br.Aplt. 31-44. Defendant has not shown that the juvenile court clearly
erred in making findings under the SYOA factors, or that the court abused its
discretion in ultimately binding Defendant over to district court.
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A. This Court should review the juvenile court's order for abuse of
discretion.
This Court has yet to review a juvenile court's decision to bind a
defendant over to adult court under the 2013 SYOA amendments. 4 Under the
previous version of the statute, a juvenile court's decision was entitled to only
"limited deference."

In re I.R.C., 2010 UT 41, i-112, 232 P.3d 1040.

But as

explained, juvenile courts previously had only limited discretion under the
SYOA. A juvenile court now has greater discretion because its decision is a
best-interest determination based on its weighing of enumerated factors.
Decisions requiring balancing traditionally invoke an abuse of discretion
standard.

See, e.g., State v. Moa, 2012 UT 28, 134, 282 P.3d 985 ("When

evaluating a sentencing determination, we traditionally afford the district court
wide latitude and discretion.") (citation, alterations, and quotations omitted);
State v. Ruiz, 2014 UT App 143, 1139, 329 P.3d 836 (reviewing for abuse of

discretion trial court decision on balancing test under rule 403, Utah Rules of
Evidence).

Balancing is afforded great deference because-like highly fact-

dependent administrative decisions- it does not lend itself "to consistent
resolution by a uniform body of appellate precedent" and the lower court "is in

In re F.L., 20140130-CA, which has been argued but not yet decided,
presents the question of the proper standard of review for post-2013 SYOA
determinations.
4
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a superior position to decide" it. Jex v. Labor Comm'n, 2013 UT 40, ,I15, 306 P.3d
799.
The new "best interests" standard is quintessentially a balancing test and therefore discretionary. See, e.g., Doyle v. Doyle, 2011 UT 42, ,I40, 258 P.3d
553 (applying abuse of discretion standard in child custody proceedings
involving "best interests" standard). A juvenile's "best interests" will depend
on the facts of each case and the juvenile court's personal observations and
specialized experience.
Juvenile courts have "special training, experience, and interest" in
dealing with minors. In re R.B., 2012 UT App 37, ,I9, 271 P.3d 827; see also In re

N.A.D., 2014 UT App 249, ,Il0, 772 Utah Adv. Rep. 29 (same); In re J.N., 2011 UT
App 413, ,I2, 267 P.3d 787 (same).
decisions.

This further justifies deference to their

As explained, juvenile systems exist because of the general

understanding that minors are less culpable and have greater prospects of
rehabilitation than adults. Cf State v. Schofield, 2002 UT 132, if 16, 63 P.3d 667
(discussing reasonable legislative distinction in creating juvenile court for youth
offenders "who are still in their formative years"). But there are exceptions to
the general rule. Because juvenile courts consistently work with all kinds of
youth, those courts are in the best position to evaluate the best interests of the
youth and the public.
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This Court should therefore apply an abuse of discretion standard to the
juvenile court's ultimate decision to bind Defendant over to the district court.
An appellate court "can properly find abuse only if no reasonable person would
~

take the view adopted by the trial court." Goggin v. Goggin, 2011 UT 76,

,r 26,

267 P.3d 885.
A juvenile court also makes factual findings in applying the SYOA factors
to the evidence before it. See In re M.E.P., 2005 UT App 227, if15, 114 P.3d 596
(citing State v. Lara, 2003 UT App 318, if9, 79 P.3d 951). Those "'underlying
factual findings ... are reviewed for clear error."' See id. (quoting Laura, 2003
UT App 318, if9).
B.

Defendant's relative culpability was significant.

Defendant argues that the juvenile court erred by finding that the relative
culpability factor weighed against him. Br.Aplt. 31-35. He argues that the court
"did not articulate the culpability" of the codefendants and "did not actually
find whether [Defendant] had a greater or lesser degree of culpability" as
compared to his codefendants. Br.Aplt. 31. He argues that based on the facts of
the crimes, and the fact that he was the youngest and s1nallest of the assailants,
the juvenile court should have found that his "relative culpability was the
lowest among the defendants'." Br.Aplt. 31 (capitalization omitted). Defendant
demonstrates no error in the juvenile court's analysis, however, because he does
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not demonstrate, or even allege, that the juvenile court clearly erred in making
its findings under this factor.
As explained, Defendant must show that the juvenile court's findings
under the SYOA factors here were clearly erroneous. In re M.E.P., 2005 UT App
227, ifl5. This is a weighty burden.

11

A finding of fact is clearly erroneous only

when, in light of the evidence supporting the finding, it is against the clear
weight of the evidence." In re J.Q., 2014 UT App 84, ,r2, 325 P.3d 114 (citing In

re E.R., 2001 UT App 66, ifll, 21 P.3d 680). As mentioned, appellate courts
afford a juvenile court's findings substantial deference because that court has
11

specialized experience and training" and the "ability to judge credibility

firsthand." Id. Thus, when reviewing a juvenile court's factual findings, an
appellate court may not reweigh the evidence. Rather, it must ask only whether
"'a foundation for the court's decision exists in the evidence."' Id. (quoting In re
B.R., 2007 UT 82, if 12, 171 P.3d 435).

The juvenile court's findings on this factor were not clearly erroneous. As
explained, the court expressly c01npared Defendant's culpability to his
codefendants' and found that "his culpability was significant." JR29. The court
specifically found that his involvement at the crime scene was "less ... than
others" because he did not wield a weapon. JR29. But it nevertheless found
that his overall culpability was" significant" because:
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• Defendant was involved in planning the robberies;
• this "planning occurred over a period of time and was not a spur of
the moment decision";
• Defendant "provided the guns knowing they would be used in the
burglary and robberies"; and
• Defendant "was present and assisted in the forced entrance into the
home."
JR29.
These findings had ample support in the evidence. In text messages the
day before the crimes, Defendant agreed to participate in a robbery and to bring
his gun. R268;SE1. The juvenile court also heard evidence that everyone in the
group agreed to the plan to rob the victim of marijuana. R288. Defendant
admitted that he supplied two of the guns used in the robberies and
participated in the robberies. R294,295-96.
Defendant does not even acknowledge his burden to show that the
juvenile court's findings were clearly erroneous. Instead, he merely reargues
the evidence before the juvenile court in the light most favorable to him.
Br.Aplt. 31-35. He emphasizes his statement to police in which he claimed that
he thought his friends wanted hin1 to bring his guns only for target shooting.
Br.Aplt. 32-33 (citing R295-96,450). He also argues that the text messages the
day before the crimes discussing guns and robberies were just jokes and did not
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refer to these crimes because they were not actually planned until the next day.
Br.Aplt. 32-34.
The juvenile court was not required to adopt Defendant's view of the
evidence. As the factfinder, the juvenile court was "in the best position to
weigh

conflicting

testimony,

to

assess

credibility,

and

from

such

determinations, render findings of fact," especially given its specialized
expertise in dealing with juveniles. In re Z.H., 2013 UT App 195, ,r2, 307 P.3d
691. Indeed, the juvenile court was "the exclusive judge of both the credibility
of witnesses and the weight to be given [to] particular evidence" because it was
the factfinder here. Cf State v. Black, 2015 UT App 30, if 19, 344 P.3d 644 Gury, as
factfinder, is exclusive judge of credibility and weight to be given evidence).
The juvenile court was free to disregard Defendant's self-serving
statement and his interpretation of the text messages. It was also free to credit
the evidence that Defendant knew that his friends wanted the guns to commit a
home-invasion robbery. This evidence included: (1) text messages the day
before the crimes in which Defendant agreed to participate in a robbery and
bring a gun, R268-70;SE1; (2) text messages the day after the crimes in which
Defendant expressed interest in possibly comn1itting another robbery, R27172;SE1; (3) the fact that one of the guns Defendant brought would have been
useless for target practice because it did not have a firing pin, and therefore
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could not fire bullets, R296; and (4) evidence that everyone agreed to the
planned robbery, R288.
The evidence amply supported the juvenile court's finding that
II

Defendant's relative culpability was significant" and that this factor weighed
against him, even though he was the youngest and smallest of the assailants,
and did not wield a weapon. JR29. Defendant therefore has not shown that the
juvenile court's findings on relative culpability were clearly erroneous.
Nor has Defendant shown that the juvenile court erred by not expressly
finding "whether [he] had a greater or lesser degree of culpability in
comparison" to his codefendants. Br.Aplt. 31. The statute did not require such
express findings. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c)(ii). Rather, it required
II

only that the court consider" relative culpability. See id. The juvenile court did
so and, as mentioned, found that Defendant's relative culpability was
"significant." JR29.
Defendant also argues that the juvenile court should have sua sponte
required a psychological evaluation of Defendant. Br.Aplt. 35. He clain1s that
such an evaluation would have shown that his immaturity made hin1
"susceptible to peer pressure." Id. But as explained, the statute did not plainly
require or even allow consideration of a psychological evaluation. See Utah
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Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c). The juvenile court therefore did not err by not sua
sponte ordering a psychological evaluation.

C.

Defend ant's role was violent, aggressive, and premeditated.
Defendant argues that the juvenile court erred in finding that his role in

the offence was violent, aggressive, or premeditated.

Br.Aplt. 35-38.

He

contends that he did not threaten anyone, that the codefendants did most of the
planning, and that the juvenile court improperly attributed the codefendants'
actions to him. Br.Aplt. 35-38. Defendant has not shown that the juvenile court
clearly erred because he again merely reargues the evidence in a light most
favorable to him.
The juvenile court's findings on this factor were not clearly erroneous. As
explained, the juvenile court found that Defendant knowingly facilitated violent
crimes by providing guns to his friends, and then participated in those crimes
himself. JR29-30. The court also found that even though Defendant may not
have wielded a weapon in the victim's home, his uninvited presence "by itself,
was a threat to the victhns and a danger to others who were in or could have
come into the home."

JR29-30.

Again, these findings were supported by

Defendant's ad1nissions, text messages, and the other evidence detailed above.
R268,288,294,295-96;SEl.
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Defendant complains that the juvenile court improperly imputed his
codefendants' violent actions to him, in violation of State v. Lara, 2003 UT App
318, ,28, 79 P.3d 951. Br.Aplt. 36-38. In Lara, the juvenile court bound the
defendant over to district court under the SYOA to face a charge of aggravated
robbery after finding that he was an accomplice to a violent carjacking. 2003 UT
App 318, 127. But Lara's only role was to drive the stolen truck away. Id.

1126,

32. Lara became involved only after his friends had forced the driver from the
truck at gunpoint and then ordered Lara to drive the truck because neither of
them could operate a standard transmission. See id. This Court reversed the
juvenile court's bindover order, because the juvenile court erroneously focused
11

on the actions of the other participants." Id. if 28.
The juvenile court here did not make the same mistake.

Rather, it

focused on Defendant's actions, not his codefendants'. JR29-30. The juvenile
court recognized that Defendant did not have a weapon in the home and that it
was the codefendants who forced their way at gun point into the victim's home.
JR29.

The court nevertheless found that Defendant's role was violent,

aggressive, and premeditated because he" facilitated" the violence in the hmne
by supplying guns, knowing that they "were intended to be used in a burglary
and robbery for drugs."

JR30.

The court further found that Defendant's
II

uninvited presence in the home was itself ... a threat to the victims." JR30.
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Thus, unlike the court in Lara, the juvenile court here based its findings on
Defendant's actions.
Defendant points out that the guns he supplied were not loaded. Br.Aplt.
40. But he does not explain why this reduces his culpability where he provided
the guns knowing that the group would use them as if they were loaded to
commit a home-invasion robbery. Defendant therefore has not shown that the
trial court clearly erred in making its findings under this factor.
D. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion in weighing
Defendant's lack of a juvenile court record.

Defendant complains about how the juvenile court phrased findings that
it made in his favor regarding his lack of any history of delinquency. Br.Aplt.

42. He argues that in finding that he had proven the first factor-no prior
weapons-related offenses in juvenile court- the juvenile court merely stated
that Defendant had no prior juvenile record, without expressly recognizing that
he had no prior weapons-related offenses. Br.Aplt. 42. Defendant argues that
II

recognizing the full nature of this factor demonstrates the egregious type of
juvenile history that might normally justify transferring a minor into adult
court." Br.Aplt. 42. In other words, Defendant argues that the juvenile court
did not weigh this factor n1ore heavily in his favor.
Defendant has not shown that the juveni]e court abused its discretion.
The court found that the first and fourth factors - both involving Defendant's
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history of delinquency-weighed in Defendant's favor. JR28,30. It nevertheless
found that those factors did not outweigh Defendant's having knowingly
facilitated violent crimes by supplying guns, and then participating in those
crimes. JR28-31. Defendant's disagreement with the juvenile court's weighing
of the SYOA factors does not show that the juvenile court abused its discretion
in ultimately finding that the combined factors weighed in favor of binding him
over to district court.
E.

Defendant did not show that public safety was better served by
retaining his case in juvenile court.

Defendant's argument on this factor rests primarily on his contention that
public safety required the juvenile court to consider his rehabilitative potential
and n1ental condition. Br.Aplt. 16-24, 38-44. As shown, however, the 2013
SYOA amendments did not. Rather, in determining what would best serve
public safety, the juvenile court considered Defendant's age, juvenile court
history, role in the offense and relative culpability, and the longer incarceration
and supervision terms available in the adult system. JR28-31.
Defendant argues that his counsel should have argued, and the juvenile
court should have recognized, that incarcerating him in the adult system would
jeopardize his safety. Br.Aplt. 22-24. He argues that juveniles incarcerated in
the adult system "are more likely to be physically and sexually abused while
incarcerated." Br.Aplt. 22. He also contends that placing juveniles in solitary
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confinement for their safety increases their likelihood of suicide and psychosis.
Br.Aplt. 24. The Utah Juvenile Defender Attorneys have filed an amicus curiae
brief contending that the adult correctional system cannot meet youth
-offenders' needs and is a dangerous place for them. Amicus Br. 5-23. But the
relevant inquiry under the SYOA's fifth factor was the public's safety, not
Defendant's. Thus, Defendant's and Amicus' s arguments are misplaced.
In any event, the juvenile court considered Defendant's interests and
vulnerabilities and concluded that remaining in juvenile court was in his best
interests. JR31. Thus, the juvenile court did not ignore Defendant's interests.
Rather, it found that the public's interests outweighed Defendant's interests
given the seriousness of his crimes, his age, and the limited sanctions available
in juvenile court.
Given the facts here, the juvenile court reasonably concluded that
"[p ]ublic safety requires a strong[ er] response and longer correctional period
than is available in the juvenile court." JR30. Defendant therefore has not
shown that the juvenile court abused its discretion in concluding that he did not
show by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the public's best interest
for his case to remain in juvenile court. See Goggin v. Goggin, 2011 UT 76, 126,
267 P.3d 885 (an appellate court "can properly find abuse only if no reasonable
person would take the view adopted by the trial court").
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III.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT HIS TRIAL COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE AT THE SYOA HEARING

In his point II(D), Defendant argues that his counsel was ineffective in
handling the evidence at the SYOA hearing and in allowing his hearing to be
conducted jointly with his codefendant Joshua Dutson.

Br.Aplt. 25-31.

Defendant has not shown that his counsel was deficient in handling the
evidence, because he asserts only that his trial counsel could have made
different arguments.

Nor has he shown prejudice, because none of the

arguments that he now contends his counsel should have made would have
likely caused the juvenile court to change its mind. As for holding a joint
hearing, the record discloses a reasonable tactical basis for doing so, and
Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced by any of the evidence that he
now complains was erroneously admitted because of his codefendant' s
participation.
A. Defendant has not shown that trial counsel performed
deficiently in arguing the evidence.

Defendant argues that his counsel should have made several different
arguments about the evidence before the juvenile court. But the fact that trial
II

counsel could have en1ployed another, possibly more reasonable or effective
strategy" does not prove that trial counsel was deficient. State v. Lucero, 2014
UT 15, ,I42, 328 P.3d 841.
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Defendant argues that his counsel should have emphasized that
Defendant was the youngest of the intruders, the second smallest, and had no
criminal history. Br.Aplt. 25. But counsel could have reasonable decided that
this was unnecessary where the juvenile court knew Defendant's age, knew the
codefendants' ages, and could see Defendant's size. R242,363. The prosecution
also stipulated, and the juvenile court found, that Defendant had no history of
delinquency. JR28-30;R320-21,362,371.
Defendant argues that his counsel should have argued that the oldest of
the codefendants "had multiple felony cases pending." Br.Aplt. 25. But counsel
could have reasonably decided not to make this argument because none of the
SYOA factors involve a codefendant' s criminal history. See Utah Code Ann.
§78A-6-702(3)(c). Rather, they focus only on the codefendant' s involvement in
the crime as compared to the defendant's. Id. §78A-6-702(3)(c)(ii).
Defendant argues that his counsel should have ren1inded the juvenile
court that under Lara, 2003 UT App 318, the court could not attribute the
misconduct of codefendants to juvenile accomplices.

Br.Aplt. 26.

But as

explained, the juvenile court based its decision on Defendant's actions, not on
his codefendants' actions.

The court found that Defendant facilitated the

violent crimes by providing the guns and being present. JR29-30. Arguing that
the court's findings were erroneous under Lara would have therefore been
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futile. Counsel's omission of a futile objection is not deficient performance.

State v. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 36, 789 Utah Adv. Rep. 21.
Defendant argues that his counsel should have elicited testimony that
Defendant "wanted the police to agree to protect him before he was willing to
acknowledge Wesley Brown's participation." Br.Aplt. 25. But the only record
evidence that Defendant cites to support this proposition is a "Declaration"
from his appellate counsel stating that she had reviewed Defendant's recorded
interrogation and that Defendant requested protection before discussing
Brown. Br.Aplt. 25 (citing R427, which in turn references R664). The record
does not contain a recording or transcript of Defendant's interrogation, or an
affidavit from Defendant establishing this fact.
Regardless, even assuming that Defendant could establish that he wanted
police protection before revealing Brown's participation, Defendant cannot
show that his counsel was ineffective for not eliciting this fact. Defendant does
not explain why this fact was so crucial that all reasonable counsel would have
elicited it. Br.Aplt. 25. Instead, he leaves this Court to speculate about its
relevancy.
The relevance of this alleged fact is not so obvious that all reasonable
counsel would have recognized and exploited it. Defendant's alleged hesitancy
to reveal Brown's participation does not establish that Brown intimidated
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Defendant into participating in the crimes. On the contrary, Defendant's text
messages and his agreement with Brown's plan demonstrate that Defendant
was a willing· participant.

Defendant therefore has not shown deficient
~

performance.
Defendant argues that his counsel should have introduced Dexter
Skinner's comments during his arrest and interrogation expressing shock and
regret that sixteen-year-olds were arrested and that Defendant, "a good kid,"
had been involved. Br.Aplt. 25. But counsel could reasonably decide not to
affirmatively introduce evidence that Defendant was involved in the robberies.
Counsel could also have reasonably decided that the juvenile court would place
little, if any weight, on a codefendant's assessment of Defendant's character.
Defendant argues that his counsel should have challenged victim
Christian Davidson's claim that this was a home-invasion robbery. Br.Aplt. 2628. Defendant argues that Davidson gave inconsistent statements about the
initial entry and that there was some evidence that the group did not forcefully
enter the home. Br.Aplt. 26-28.
Defendant proffers no evidence to contradict the victims' statements that
once inside the hon1e, the intruders robbed the victims at gunpoint. In fact,
Dexter Skinner confessed that he and Brown drew their guns, commanded the
victims "to get down on the ground and told them they were taking their
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weed." R237. Defendant likewise confessed that the group robbed the victims
at gunpoint.

R295.

Given this evidence, counsel could have reasonably

concluded that the juvenile court would find that the group robbed the victims
at gunpoint in Davidson's home, regardless of how the group initially entered
that home. Given that reality, counsel could have reasonably decided not to
nitpick Davidson's testimony about the initial forced entry.
In sum, Defendant has not shown that his counsel's arguing of the
evidence was objectively unreasonable.
B.

Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced because none
of the arguments he now makes would have undermined the
basis for the juvenile court's ruling.
Even if Defendant had shown that his trial counsel should have argued

the evidence differently, Defendant has not shown that he was prejudiced. As
explained, the juvenile court based its decision on the fact that Defendant
knowingly facilitated violent crimes and also participated in those crimes.
JR28-31.

Defendant admitted these facts and none of the arguments that

Defendant now claims his trial counsel should have made undern1ine his
admissions. Defendant therefore has not shown prejudice. See Strickland v.

WashiHgton, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (prejudice requires reasonable probability
of different result).
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C.

Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective for
agreeing to a joint hearing.

Defendant argues that his counsel should have objected to holding his
SYOA bindover hearing jointly with codefendant Joshua Dutson. Br.Aplt. 2830. Defendant argues that this allowed the juvenile court to hear otherwise
inadmissible hearsay that (1) the group allegedly committed other robberies, (2)
the group all agreed on Brown's plan to rob the victims, and (3) Defendant held
a gun or a switchblade during the robberies. Br.Aplt. 28-30.
Defendant has not shown that his counsel was ineffective, because the
record discloses a reasonable strategic explanation for holding a joint hearing.
As mentioned, the SYOA required the juvenile court to compare Defendant's
conduct with that of his codefendants. See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3)(c)(ii).
The evidence demonstrated, and the juvenile court ultimately found, that
Defendant's participation at the crin1e scene was "less ... than others" because
he

did

not wield

a weapon

while

others,

including Dutson,

did.

R284,287,299;JR29. Dutson confessed to wielding a gun during the robberies.
R284,287. The evidence was conflicting, however, as to whether Defendant did.
R253,284,287,299. Trial counsel could have therefore reasonably concluded that
juxtaposing Defendant's participation with Dutson' s would benefit Defendant.
Indeed, that strategy was partia 11y successfu 1because it produced a finding that
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Defendant's participation at the crime scene was less than that of his
codefendants. JR29.
As mentioned, to prove that his trial counsel's performance was
objectively unreasonable, Defendant must prove that "there was no conceivable
tactical basis" for his counsel's actions. State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, iJ6, 89 P.3d
162 (quotation and citation omitted). The record here discloses a tactical-and
partially successful - basis for holding Defendant's SYOA hearing together with
Dutson's. The fact that this strategy was not completely successful does not
undermine its reasonableness. See State v. Tyler, 850 P.2d 1250, 1258 (Utah 1993)
(" A defendant is not guaranteed successful assistance of counsel, and
competency of counsel is not measured by the result.") (quotations and citations
omitted).
Moreover, Defendant has not shown that it was objectively unreasonable
for his counsel not to object to the hearsay evidence that he now identifies.
Defendant recognizes that, under rule 220), Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure,
hearsay is ad1nissible in a SYOA preliminary hearing. Br.Aplt. 28. Defendant
nevertheless argues that hearsay is not admissible in the portion of the hearing
addressing the SYOA factors, because rule 23A(d), Utah Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, gives a Defendant the right to cross-examine adverse witnesses at
the hearing. Br.Aplt. 28. But the fact that a defendant has the right to cross-
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examme adverse witnesses at a hearing does not mean that hearsay is
inadmissible. On the contrary, hearsay is admissible at preliminary hearings in
adult court even though defendants have the right to cross-examine the
prosecution's witnesses.

See Utah R. Evid. 1102(a) ("Reliable hearsay is

admissible at criminal preliminary examinations"); Utah R. Crim. P. 7(i)(1)
II

(granting a defendant the opportunity to cross-examine adverse witnesses" at
a preliminary hearing in district court). Because Defendant has not shown that
hearsay is obviously inadmissible at a SYOA preliminary hearing, he has not
shown that his counsel was deficient for not objecting to the hearsay he now
challenges.
Nor has Defendant proven prejudice. Defendant complains that because
of the joint hearing, the juvenile court heard evidence that Dutson told police
about other robberies Defendant and his cohorts committed. Br.Aplt. 29-30.
But Defendant points to nothing in the record that even suggests that this
evidence affected the juvenile court's decision, especially where the detective
admitted that Defendant was not involved in any other robberies.
Detective Barker admitted that he received conflicting accounts about
other robberies.
11

R285-86.

He ultimately agreed on cross-examination that

there were no other incidents" that Defendant and Dutson were involved in.

R307. The prosecution did not rely on the allegations of other robberies, nor did
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the juvenile court mention those allegations in making its decision.

R362-

67,370-75;JR28-31.

Defendant also complains about Dutson's statement that everyone agreed
to the robbery plan.

Br.Aplt. 30.

But Defendant's own text messages

established that a robbery was planned and that he would participate and
provide guns. R268-72;SE1. Defendant argues that the text messages were
jokes and that the robbery here was not planned until the day after the texts.
Br.Aplt. 34. But as explained, the juvenile court was not required to accept
Defendant's interpretation of the evidence.
Finally, Defendant complains that the juvenile court heard Dutson' s
statement that Defendant wielded a gun or a knife during the robberies.
Br.Aplt. 30. But the juvenile court found that Defendant did not wield any
weapon. JR29.
Defendant has not proven that any of the hearsay evidence effected the
juvenile court's decision. Defendant therefore has not proven prejudice. See
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
IV.
DEFENDANT HAS NOT SHOWN THAT THE JUVENILE COURT JUDGE
PLAINLY ERRED BY NOT SUA SPONTE RECUSING HERSELF WHERE NO
CONTROLLING AUTHORITY REQUIRED RECUSAL

In his point III, Defendant argues that the juvenile court judge plainly
erred by not recusing herself. Br.Aplt. 44-52. Defendant asserts that recusal
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was appropriate because: (1) the judge is married to the Chief Criminal Deputy
in the Weber County Attorney's Office, the prosecuting entity; and (2) the judge
was a former prosecutor who worked in that office. Br.Aplt. 45. Defendant has
not shown that the juvenile court plainly erred because no controlling authority
plainly required the judge to recuse herself.
A. The judge's marriage did not plainly require recusal.
Defendant argues that rule 2.11 of the Code of Judicial Conduct "tacitly
recognizes" that the judge should have recused herself. Br.Aplt. 46-48. That
rules requires a judge to "disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in
which the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including"
when the judge's spouse is "a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director,
general partner, managing member, or trustee of a party."

Utah R. Jud.

Conduct 2.ll(A)(2)(a).
As Defendant recognizes, the plain language of this rule did not require
recusal.

Defendant argues only that the rule "tacitly" recognized that the

judge's marriage to a supervisor in the prosecutor's office required recusal.
Br.Aplt. 47. But an error is obvious only when it violates "the plain language of
the relevant statute," not its "tacit" implications. Isom, 2015 UT App 160, if 28.
Regardless, the language did not even "tacitly" require recusal here. A
prosecutor is not a party to a criminal action, nor is he an "officer, director,
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general partner, managing member, or trustee" of the State of Utah in the sense
that those terms are used in rule 2.11. See Utah R. Jud. Conduct 2.ll(A)(2)(a).
Rather, the rule requires recusal only when the judge's spouse is an actual
party, or so closely aligned with a party, that the spouse has a direct interest in
the litigation.
Prosecutors have no direct interest in criminal cases, and especially not in
cases where they are not representing the State. Defendant cites no controlling
authority interpreting rule 2.11 as he now does.
Based on a footnote in Regional Sales Agency, Inc. v. Reichert, 830 P.2d 252,
255 n.1 (Utah 1992), Defendant argues that an attorney for a party can be
considered to be "the party itself." Br.Aplt. 47. That was not Reichert's holding.
On the contrary, the Utah Supreme Court expressly declined to consider
"whether an attorney is a 'party'" because that issue was "not essential to the
determination" there. Reichert, 830 P.2d at 255 n.1. Thus, Reichert does not
establish that the juvenile court judge should have plainly recognized that by
being married to a prosecutor, she was actually married to the State of Utah.
Defendant argues that recusal was required because even if the judge's
husband was not a party, he became involved in Defendant's case "after
[Defendant] went to prison" and Defendant's appellate counsel began
requesting documents. Br.Aplt. 47-48. But even if the judge's husband's later
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involvement with appellate counsel's post-sentencing document requests in
district court could be enough to require the juvenile court judge to disqualify
herself, it cannot establish that the judge plainly erred by not doing so. The
involvement that Defendant identifies occurred long after his case was
transferred to adult court, and even after he was convicted and sentenced.
Br.Aplt. 47-48. The prosecutor who did handle the case explained that although
the judge's husband was the Chief Criminal Deputy in the Weber County
Attorney's Office, he had nothing to do with this case in juvenile court, did not
supervise juvenile court attorneys, and was not involved in any juvenile court
matters. R504-05. Because her spouse was not involved in Defendant's case
while it was before her, the juvenile court judge's marriage did not require her
sua sponte recusal.
Non-controlling authority supports that conclusion. In State v. Harrell,
546 N.W.2d 115, 116-18 (Wis. 1996), the Wisconsin Supreme Court rejected the

argun1ent that a judge's marriage to a prosecutor in the office prosecuting the
defendant required the judge to recuse himself. The court observed that "the
special characteristics of government attorneys make it unlikely that a judge's
relationship with one would affect his or her impartiality."

Id. at 118.

Prosecutors do "not have the same type of interest in the outcome of a trial as
does a member of a private law firm" because a prosecutor "has no financial
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interest in the outcome of the case and any reputational interest 'without the
financial

interest✓

is not enough to create [even] an appearance of partiality [in

the judge]."' Id. (quoting State v. Logan, 689 P.2d 778, 785 (Kan. 1984)). The
court found the "thought that a judge would have an increased propensity to
II

convict criminals because of such a relationship" to be preposterous."

Id.

(quotation and citation omitted).
Defendant relies on a Colorado case, Smith v. Beckman, 683 P.2d 1214
(Colo. 1984), to support his claim that a judge's marriage to a prosecutor creates
an appearance of impropriety, even when the prosecutor-spouse is not involved
in the case before the judge. Br.Aplt. 45, 51-52. But his non-binding precedent
cannot show that the juvenile court plainly erred. See Isom, 2015 UT App 160,

if 28 (to be plain, error must contravene settled appellate law).
Even if Beckman were relevant to Defendant's claim of plain error, it
would not be persuasive. As the Minnesota Court of Appeals has observed, the
11

the reasoning of Beckman, a 1984 decision, runs counter to that of the great

majority of subsequent cases." In re Jacobs, 791 N.W.2d 300, 302 (Mim1. App.
2010). Like those subsequent cases, the Minnesota Court of Appeals refused to
hold "that the institutional loyalty of a prosecutor-spouse could reasonably
appear to affect the impartiality of the judge-spouse."
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Thus,

Defendant has not shown that the juvenile court judge's marriage obviously
required her to sua sponte recuse herself.

B.

The judge's former employment as a prosecutor did not plainly
require recusal.
Defendant also argues that section 78A-2-222 plainly required the judge

to either obtain the consent of the parties to preside over the case or recuse
herself. Br.Aplt. 48-51. Subsection (l)(b) of that statute prohibits a judge from
hearing a case in which she "is related to either party by consanguinity or
affinity within the third degree" unless the parties consent. Utah Code Ann.
§78A-2-222(1)(b) (West 2009). Subsection (l)(c) prohibits a judge from hearing a
case "when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action or
proceeding" unless the parties consent. Id. §78A-2-222(1)(c). Defendant argues
that recusal was plainly required under both subsections. Br.Aplt. 45-52.
Defendant again argues that because Reichert defined "party" to include
the party's attorneys, the juvenile court judge here was married to a party: the
State of Utah.

Br.Aplt. 48.

As explained, however, that was not Reichert's

holding. Thus, Defendant has not shown that subsection (l)(b) plainly required
recusal.
Nor did subsection (l)(c) require recusal, even though the judge had
previously worked as a prosecutor. On the contrary, this Court has held that
this subsection does not require a judge to "recuse herself in every case ...
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where her former employer participates as counsel in the proceeding on a
matter in which the judge herself never participated."

See Kunej v. Labor

Commission, 2013 UT App 172, ,I19, 306 P.3d 855 (citing In re Affidavit of Bias, 947
vJ

P.2d 1152, 1155 (Utah 1997)).
Kunej brought an employment discrimination claim against the
University of Utah. Id. at ,r1. The Utah Attorney General's Office represented
the University. Id. if 18. The administrative law judge who heard the case had
previously worked for both the University and the Attorney General's Office.

Id. ,I18. But her former employment did not require the judge to recuse herself
under section 78A-2-222(1)(c) where nothing suggested "any connection
between the present litigation and any matters" the judge was involved in
during her previous employment. Id. ,I19.
Likewise, nothing in this record shows, or even suggests, that the judge
had any involvement in Defendant's case when she worked as a prosecutor.
According to her online biography, the judge left the prosecutor's office in 1995,
two years before Defendant was born.

See Second District Juvenile Court

Judges' Biographies,(www.utcourts.gov/judgesbios/ showGallery.asp?dist=2&
ct_type=J). Defendant therefore has not shown that the judge erred, let alone
plainly erred, by not recusing herself.
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C.

Defendant has not shown prejudice.

Even if Defendant had shown that recusal was plainly required, he has
not shown prejudice, as he must to establish plain error. Defendant does not
allege that the juvenile court here was biased. Br.Aplt. 44-52. Rather, he asserts
that the judge's marriage created only an "appearance of impropriety" and a
"reasonable inference" of bias. Br.Aplt. 45, 51. But appearances and inferences
do not establish actual bias. See State v. Alonzo, 932 P.2d 606, 611-12 (Utah App.
1997) (affidavits showing appearance of bias insufficient to show actual bias).
Defendant therefore has not carried his burden to show plain error. See Isom,
2015 UT App 160, 128.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
Respectfully submitted on August 5, 2015.
D. REYES
Utah Attorney General

SEAN

cHRISTHERD. BALLARD
Assistant Attorney General
Counsel for Appellee
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Addendum A

UTAH CODE ANN.

§78A-6-701 (West Supp 2013). Jurisdiction of district court
(1) The district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years
of age or older charged with:
(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by
an adult; or
(b) an offense which would be a felony if committed by an adult if the minor
has been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in Section 62A7-101. This Subsection (l)(b) shall not apply if the offense is committed in a
secure facility.
(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a minor under
this section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the minor regarding all
offenses joined with the qualifying offense, and any other offenses, including
misdemeanors, arising from the same criminal episode. The district court is not
divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact that the minor is allowed to enter a
plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense.
(3)(a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the offense over
which the district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection (1) or (2) shall be
tried against the defendant as an adult in the district court or justice court having
jurisdiction.
(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a
finding of not guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the
juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice
Services regain any jurisdiction and authority previously exercised over the
minor.

Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 445, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 38, § 6, eff. March 22, 2010.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2010, c. 38, § 6, in subsec. (1), substituted "has" for" shall have" and deleted
"by information or indictment" following" charged".
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§ 78A-6-702 (West Supp. 2013). Serious youth offender--Procedure

(1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general
charging a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal
infonnation and filed in the juvenile court if the information charges any of the
following offenses:
(a) any felony violation of:
(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;

(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury
to another;
(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnapping;
(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;
(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;
(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;
(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm;
(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or
(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or
(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (1)(a) involving the use of a
dangerous weapon, which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and
the minor has been previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense
involving the use of a dangerous weapon, which also would have been a
felony if committed by an adult.

(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under
Subsection (1) shall be conducted in conformity ,vith the rules established by the
Utah Supreme Court.
(3)(a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1),
the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of
proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in
Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant committed it. If
proceeding under Subsection (l )(b), the state shal] have the additional burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has previously
been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous
weapon.
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(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this
Subsection (3), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and
held to answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless the
juvenile court judge finds that it would be conh·ary to the best interest of the
minor and to the public to bind over the defendant to the jurisdiction of the
dish·ict court.
(c) In making the bind over determination in Subsection (3)(b), the judge shall
consider only the following:
(i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent for an
offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony
if committed by an adult;
(ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether
the minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the
codefendants;
(iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was committed in a
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner;
(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the
juvenile court; and
(v) whether public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the
juvenile court or in the dish·ict court.
(d) Once the state has met its burden under Subsection (3)(a) as to a showing
of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and
presenting evidence that in light of the considerations listed in Subsection
(3)(c), it would be conb·ary to the best interest of the minor and the best
interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the
district court.
(e) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that it
would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the best interests of the
public to bjnd the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court, the
court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for trial as a 111-inor
and shall proceed upon the information as though it ,vere a juvenile petition.

(-:!:) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been con-imHted, but that
the state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the
defendant over under Subsection (1), the juvenile court judge shall order the
defendant held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the information as
though it were a juvenile petition.
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(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a crhninal warrant of arrest shall
issue. The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal
defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The
juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.

(6) If an indichnent is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this
section, the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not
include a finding of probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was
committed and that the defendant committed it, but the juvenile court shall
proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional considerations
listed in Subsection (3)(b).

(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same
information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for
one or more charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same
criminal episode and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against
him shall be considered together with those charges, and where the court finds
probable cause to believe that those crimes have been committed and that the
defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to the district
court to answer for those charges.
(8) When a minor has been bound over to the dish·ict court under this section, the
jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court over
the minor is terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from
the same criminal episode, and any subsequent misde1neanors or felonies
charged against the minor, except as provided in Subsection (12).
(9) A 1ninor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the dish·ict court under
this section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not
entitled to a preliminary examination in the dish·ict court.
(10) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant
has previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a
dangerous weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the cri111.inal
offense and do not need to be proven at h·ial in the d ish·ict court.
(11) 1f a rninor enlers a plea to, or is found guiily of, any of the charges filed or
any other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court
retains jurisdktion over the minor for alJ purpnsr"\s/ including sentencing.

(12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile
Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over
the minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all
charges in the dish·ict court.
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Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 446, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 38, § 7, eff. March 22, 2010;
Laws 2010, c. 218, § 39, eff. May 11, 2010; Laws 2012, c. 118, § 1, eff. May 8, 2012;
Laws 2013, c. 186, § 1, eff. May 14, 2013.
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Laws 2010, c. 38, § 7, inserted subsec. (8) and renumbered former subsecs. (8) to
(11) as subsecs. (9) to (12).

Laws 2010, c. 218, § 39, in subsec. (l)(a)(vii), substituted "76-10-508.1" for "76-10508", inserted "felony" and deleted "from a vehicle" following "firearm".
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of
Laws 2010, c. 38, § 7 and Laws 2010, c. 218, § 39.
Laws 2012, c. 118, § 1, in subsec. (l)(a)(ii), substituted "Section 76-5-103,
aggravated assault resulting in" for "Subsection 76-5-103(1)(a), aggravated
assault, involving intentionally causing".
Laws 2013, c. 186, § 1, in subsec. (l)(a)(iii), substituted "kidnapping" for
"kidnaping"; and rewrote subsec. (3), which formerly read:
"(3)(a) If the infonnation alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1),
the state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of
proof to establish probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in
Subsection (1) has been committed and that the defendant committed it. If
proceeding under Subsection (1)(6), the state shall have the additional burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has previously
been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous
weapon.
11

(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this
Subsection (3), the court shal1 order that the defendant be bound over and held to
answer in the district court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile
court judge finds that all of the following conditions exist:
"(i) the minor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense
involving the use of a dangerous weapon which vvould be a felony if con1111itted
by an adult;
11

(ii) that if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, the n1inor
appears to have a lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; and
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11

(iii) that the 1ninor' s role in the offense was not com1nitted in a violent,
aggressive, or premeditated manner.
11

(c) Once the state has met its burden under this Subsection (3) as to a showing
of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and
presenting evidence as to the existence of the above conditions.
11

d) If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that all the
above conditions are satisfied, the court shall so state in its findings and order the
minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the information as though
it were a juvenile petition."
(
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§ 78A-6-703 (West Supp. 2013). Certification hearings--Juvenile court to hold

preliminary hearing--Factors considered by juvenile court for waiver of
jurisdiction to district court
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3)
alleges the co1n1nission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by

an adult, the juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing.
(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward
with its case and the burden of establishing:
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the
defendant committed it; and
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best
interests of the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain
jurisdiction.

(3) In considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the
minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile
court shall consider, and may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of
the following factors:
(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the
community requires isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile
facilities;
(b) whether the alleged offense was committed by the minor under
circumstances which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under
Section 76-3-203.1 if the minor were adult and the offense was committed:
(i) in concert with two or more persons;

(ii) for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal
street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802; or
(iii) to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or increased status vvith
a criminal street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802;
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weight being given to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section
76-8-418;
(e) the maturity of the 1ninor as determined by considerations of the minor's
home, environment, emotional attitude, and .pattern of living;
u
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(f) the record and previous history of the minor;
(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to
the juvenile court;
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court
when the minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be
charged with a crime in the district court;

(i) whether the 1ninor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and

G) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school
premises as provided in Section 76-10-505.5.
(4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3)
is discretionary with the court.
(S)(a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental,
physical, educational, and social history may be considered by the court.
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested
party, the court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and
other material to appear and be subject to both direct and cross-examination.

(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call
witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors
required by Subsection (3).
(7) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court
may enter an order:
(a) certifying that finding; and
(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district

court.
(8) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held
by the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the
juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the
additional consideration referred to in Subsection (2)(b).
(9) The provisions of Section 78A-6-1l5, Section 'lSA-6-1111, and other provisions
relating to proceedings in juvenile cases arc applicable to the hearing held under
this section to the extent they are pertinent.

(10) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the
district court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the dislTict court.
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(11) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the
same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that
right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in
accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.
(12) When a minor has been certified to the dish·ict court under this section, the
jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the
juvenile court over the minor is tenninated regarding that offense, any other
offenses arising from the same criminal episode, and any subsequent
misdemeanors or felonies charged against the minor, except as provided in
Subsection (14).
(13) If a 1ninor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on
any other offense arising out of the same cri1ninal episode, the district court
retains jurisdiction over the 111inor for all purposes, including sentencing.
(14) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile
Justice Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over
the minor when there is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all
charges in the district court.

Credits
l.iJ

Laws 2008, c. 3, § 447, eff. Feb. 7, 2008; Laws 2010, c. 38, § 8, eff. March 22, 2010;
Laws 2010, c. 193, § 22, eff. Nov. 1, 2010.

HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
II

Laws 2010, c. 38, § 8, in subsec. (12), deleted or when a criminal information or
indictment is filed in a court of competent jurisdiction before a committing
magistrate charging the minor ,vith an offense described in Section 78A-6-702"
following section,".
II

Laws 2010, c. 193, § 22, rewrote subsec. (3)(b), in subsec. (3)(e), substituted "the
n1inor' s" for "his" and in subsec. (12), subs ti tu ted "the minor" for "him". Fonner
subsec. (3)(6) read:
"(b) ,vhether the alleged offense was committed by the minor in concert with hvo
or 111.ore persons under circumstances \Vhich \vould subject the miner to
enhanced penalties under Sce_'tion 7t,-3-203.1 \\.(·re he an adult:;"'
Composite section by the Office of Legislative Research and General Counsel of
Laws 2010, c. 38, § 8 and Laws 2010, c. 193, § 22.
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§ 78A-2-222 (West 2009). Disqualification for interest or relation to parties

(1) Except by consent of all parties, a justice, judge, or justice court judge may not
sit or act in any action or proceeding:
(a) to which he is a party, or in which he is interested;
(b) when he is related to either party by consanguinity or affinity within the
third degree, computed according to the rules of the common law; or
(c) when he has been attorney or counsel for either party in the action or
proceeding.
(2) The provisions of this section do not apply to the arrangement of the calendar
or the regulation of the order of business, nor to the power of transferring the
action or proceeding to some other court.
Credits
Laws 2008, c. 3, § 312, eff. Feb. 7, 2008.
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Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure
Rule 22. Initial appearance and preliminary examination in cases under
Section 78A-6-702 and Section 78A-6-703.

(a) When a smnmons is issued in lieu of a warrant of arrest, the minor shall
appear before the court as directed in the summons.
(b) When any peace officer or other person makes an arrest of a minor without a
warrant, the minor shall be taken to a detention center pending a detention
hearing, which shall be held as provided by these rules. When any peace officer
makes an arrest of a minor with a warrant, the minor shall be taken to the place
designated on the warrant. If an information has not been filed, one shall be filed
without delay in the court with jurisdiction over the offense.
(c) If a minor is arrested in a county other than '"'here the offense was committed
the minor shall without unnecessary delay be returned to the county where the
crime was committed and shall be taken before a judge of the juvenile court.
(d) The court shall, upon the minor's first appearance, inform the minor:
(d)(1) of the charge in the information or indictment and furnish the 1ninor
with a copy;
(d)(2) of any affidavit or recorded testimony given in support of the
information and how to obtain them;
(d)(3) of the right to retain counsel or have counsel appointed by the court
without expense if the minor is unable to obtain counsel;
(d)(4) of rights concerning detention, pretrial release, and bail in the event the
minor is bound over to stand trial in district court; and
(d)(S) that the minor is not required to make any staten1ent, and that any
statements made may be used against the minor in a court of law.
(e) The court shall, after providing the information under paragraph (d) and
before proceeding further, allow the minor reasonable time and opportunity to
consult counsel and shall allow the minor to contact any attorney by any
reasonable means, vvithout delay and \Vithoul fee.

(f)("1) The mjnor may not be called on to enter a plea. During the initial
appear::nce, the minor shall be advised of the right to a preliminary cxmnina tion
and, as applicable, to a certification hearing pursuant to Section ?SA-6-703 or to
the right to present evidence regarding the conditions established by Section
?SA-6-702. If the minor waives the right to a preliminary examination and, if
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applicable, a certification hearing, and if the prosecuting attorney consents, the
court shall order the minor bound over to answer in the district court.
(f)(2) If the minor does not waive a preliminary examination, the court shall
schedule the preliminary examination. The thne periods of this rule may be
extended by the court for good cause shown. The preliminary examination
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than ten days after the
initial appearance if the minor is in custody for the offense charged and the
information is filed under Section 78A-6-702. The preliminary examination
shall be held within a reasonable time, but not later than 30 days after the
initial appearance if:
(f)(2)(A) the minor is in custody for the offense charged and the
information is filed under Section78A-6-703; or
(f)(2)(B) the minor is not in custody.
(f)(3) A preliminary examination may not be held if the minor is indicted. If
the indictment is filed under 78A-6-703, the court shall proceed in accordance
with Rule 23 to hear evidence presented by the prosecutor regarding the
factors of Section 78A-6-703 for waiver of jurisdiction and certification, unless
the hearing is waived. If the indictment is filed under Section 78A-6-702, the
court shall proceed in accordance with Rule 23A to hear evidence presented
by the minor regarding the conditions of Section 78A-6-702, if requested.
(g) A preliminary examination shall be held under the rules and laws applicable
to criminal cases tried before a court. The state has the burden of proof and shall
proceed first with its case. At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may
testify under oath, call witnesses, and present evidence. The 1ninor may crossexamine adverse witnesses.
(h) If from the evidence the court finds probable cause to believe that the crime
charged has been committed and that the minor has cmnmitted it, and if the
information is filed under Section 78A-6-703, the court shall proceed in
accordance with Rule 23 to hear evidence presented by the prosecutor regarding
the factors of Section 78A-6-703 for ·vvaiver of jurisdiction and certification.

(i) If from the evidence the court finds probable cause to believe that the crilne
charged has been c01nmitted and that tbe minor has comn1itted it, and if the
in.formation is filed under Section78A-6-702, the court shali proceed in
accordance with Rule 23A to hear evidence presented by the minor regarding the
conditions of Section 78A-6-702.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

G) The finding of probable cause may be based on hearsay in whole or in part.
Objections to evidence on the ground that it was acquired by unlawful means are
not properly raised at the preliminary examination.
(k) If the court does not find probable cause to believe that the crime charged has
been committed or that the minor com1nitted it, the court shall dismiss the
information and discharge the minor. The court may enter findings of fact,
conclusions of law, and an order of dismissal. The dismissal and discharge do
not preclude the state from instituting a subsequent prosecution for the same
offense.

(1) At a preliminary examination, upon request of either party, and subject to
Title 77, Chapter 38, Victim Rights, the court may:

(1)(1) exclude witnesses from the courtroom;
(1)(2) require witnesses not to converse with each other until the preliminary
examination is concluded; and

(1)(3) exclude spectators from the courtroom.

l,:j)

Rule 23A. Hearing on conditions of Section 78A-6-702; bind over to district
court.
(a) If a criminal indictment under Section 78A-6-702 alleges the commission of a
felony, the court shall, upon the request of the minor, hear evidence and consider
the conditions in paragraph (c).

~

vj

(b) If a crhninal infonnation under Section 78A-6-702 alleges the con1111ission of a
felony, after a finding of probable cause in accordance with Rule 22, the court
shall hear evidence and determine whether the conditions of paragraph (c) exist.
(c) The minor shall have the burden of going forward and presenting evidence of
the following conditions as provided in Section 78A-6-702:
(c)(1) the 1ninor has not been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense
involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if
:-1i,, ;.->dnlt··
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(c)(2) that if the offense ,vas committed vvjth one or more other persons, the
rninor appear5 to have 2 lesser degree of culpability than the codefcnd ants,:

(c)(3) that the minor's role in the offense was not committed in a violent,
aggressive, or premeditated manner;
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(c)(4) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile
court; and
(c)(S) that public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the
juvenile court or in the district court.
(d) At the conclusion of the minor's case, the state may call witnesses and present
evidence on the conditions required by Section 78A-6-702. The minor may crossexamine adverse witnesses.
(e) If the court does not find by clear and convincing evidence that it would be
conh·ary to the best interest of the minor and the best interests of the public to
bind the minor over to the jurisdiction of the district court, the court shall enter
an order directing the 1ninor to answer the charges in district court.

(£)(1) Upon entry of an order directing the minor to answer the charges in district
court, the court shall comply with the requirements of Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.
By issuance of a warrant of arrest or continuance of an existing warrant, the court
may order the minor c01n1nitted to jail in accordance with Section 62A-7-201. The
court shall enter the appropriate written order.
(f)(2) Once the 1ninor is bound over to district court, a determination
regarding where the minor is held shall be made pursuant to Section 78A-6702.
(f)(3) The clerk of the juvenile court shall transmit to the clerk of the dish-ict
court all pleadings in and records made of the proceedings in the juvenile
court.
(f)(4) The jurisdiction of the court shall terminate as provided by statute.
(g) If the court finds probable cause to believe that a felony has been com1nitted
and that the minor comn1itted it and also finds that all of the conditions of
Section 78A-6-702 are present, the court shall proceed upon the information as if
it were a petition. The court may order the minor held in a detention center or
released in accordance with Rule 9.
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Utah Code of Judicial Conduct
RULE 2.11. Disqualification
(A) A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the
judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including but not limited to
the following circumstances:
~

(1) The judge has a personal bias or prejudice concerning a party or a party's
lawyer, or personal knowledge of facts that are in dispute in the proceeding.

(2) The judge knows that the judge, the judge's spouse or domestic partner, or
~

a person within the third degree of relationship to either of them, or the
spouse or domestic parb1er of such a person is:
(a) a party to the proceeding, or an officer, director, general partner,
managing member, or trustee of a party;
(b) acting as a lawyer in the proceeding;
(c) a person who has more than a de minimis interest that could be
substantially affected by the proceeding; or
(d) likely to be a material witness in the proceeding.
(3) The judge knows that he or she, individually or as a fiduciary, or the
judge's spouse, domestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the
judge's family residing in the judge's household, has an economic interest in
the subject matter in conh·oversy or in a party to the proceeding.

(4) The judge knows or learns by means of a timely motion that a party, a
party's lawyer, or the law firm of a party's lawyer has within the previous
three years made aggregate contributions to the judge's retention in an
amount that is greater than $50.

(5) The judge, while a judge or a judicial candidate, has made a public
statement, other than in a court proceeding, judicial decision, or opinion, that
comrnHs or appears to commit the judge to reach a particular result or rule in
a particular way in the proceeding or controversy.
(6) The judge:
(a) served as a la,vyer in the matter in controversy, or ,vas associated with
a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the ma tier during

such association;
(b) served in governmental employni.ent, and in such capacity participated
personally and substantially as a lavvyer or public official concerning the
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proceeding, or has publicly expressed in such capacity an opinion
concerning the merits of the particular matter in controversy;
(c) was a material witness concerning the matter; or
(d) previously presided as a judge over the matter in another court and is
now acting as a judge who would hear the appeal or trial de nova.
(B) A judge shall keep informed about the judge's personal and fiduciary
economic interests, and make a reasonable effort to keep informed about the
personal economic interests of the judge's spouse or domestic partner and minor
children residing in the judge's household.
(C) A trial court judge subject to disqualification under this Rule, other than for
bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(l), may disclose on the record the basis of
the judge's disqualification and may ask the parties and their lawyers to
consider, outside the presence of the judge and court personnel, whether to
waive disqualification. If, following the disclosure, the parties and lawyers agree,
without participation by the judge or court personnel, that the judge should not
be disqualified, the judge may participate in the proceeding. The agreement shall
be incorporated into the record of the proceeding.
(D) An appellate court judge or justice subject to disqualification under this Rule,
other than for bias or prejudice under paragraph (A)(l), may send notice to the
parties disclosing the basis for the judge or justice's disqualification and asking
them to consider whether to waive disqualification. With respect to paragraphs
(A)(2) or (A)(3), the judge or justice may participate in the decision of the case if
all parties, other than the party presumably benefitted by the apparent bias
constituting the disqualifying circumstance, waive the disqualification. With
respect to paragraphs (A)(4) through (A)(6), the judge or justice may participate
in the decision of the case if all parties waive the disqualification. The responses
to a notice of a disqualifying circumstance shall be included in the appellate file
pertaining to the proceeding.

COMMENT
[1 l Under this Rule, a judge is disqualified whenever the judge's jmpartiality
n1ight reasonably be questioned, regardless of whether any of the specific
provisions of paragraphs (A)(l) through (6) apply.
[2] A judge's obligation not to hear or decide n1atters in which disqualification is
required applies regardless of whether a 111.otion to disqualify is filed.
[3] The rule of necessity may override the rule of disqualification. For example, a
judge might be required to participate in judicial review of a judicial salary
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statute, or might be the only judge available in a matter requiring immediate
judicial action, such as a hearing on probable cause or a temporary restraining
order. In matters that require immediate action, the judge must disclose on the
record the basis for possible disqualification and make reasonable efforts to
h·ansfer the matter to another judge as soon as practicable.
[4] A judge is disqualified in proceedings involving a law firm that e1nploys the
judge's spouse, dmnestic partner, parent, or child, or any other member of the
judge's family residing in the judge's household as an equity holder in the law
firm. A judge·is not disqualified in other situations unless the judge's
impartiality might reasonably be questioned under paragraph (A), or a relative is
known by the judge to have an interest in the law firm that could be substantially
affected by the proceeding under paragraph (A)(2)(c).
[5] A judge should disclose on the record information that the judge believes the
parties or their lawyers might reasonably consider relevant to a possible motion
for disqualification, even if the judge believes there is no basis for
disqualification.
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1

SERIOUS YOUTH OFFENDER AMENDMENTS

2

2013 GENERAL SESSION

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

Chief Sponsor: V. Lowry Snow

5

Senate Sponsor: Lyle W. Hillyard

6
7

LONG TITLE

8

General Description:

9

This bill amends the procedure to transfer jurisdiction for a serious youth offender from

IO

a juvenile court to a district court.

11

Highlighted Provisions:

12

This bill:

13

•

provides for a juvenile court judge to consider a minor's prior adjudications in

14

juvenile court. a minor's best interest, and the public's safety when determining a

15

jurisdiction transfer from a juvenile court to a district court; and

16

17

18
19

20

•

makes technical changes.

Money Appropriated in this Bill:
None
Other Special Clauses:
None

11

Utah Code Sections Affected:

22

AMENDS:

2.1
,._- r ·- ...
t~ 1

u

1

26

Section I. Section 78A-6-702 is amended to read:

27

7SA-6-702. Serious }'oulh offender -- Procedure.

28

( 1) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging

29

~

L 1u/,.

a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony shall be by criminal information and filed in the
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juvenile court if the information charges any of the following offenses:

31

(a) any felony violation of:

32

(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;

33

(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another;

34

(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated [kidnaping] kidnapping;

35

(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary;

36

(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;

37

(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;

38

(vii) Section 76- 10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm;

39

(viii) Section 76-5-202, attempted aggravated murder; or

40

(ix) Section 76-5-203, attempted murder; or

41

(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection (] )(a) involving the use of a

42

dangerous weaponi which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been

43

previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weaponi

44

which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult.

45
46

(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection
(I) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court.

47

(3) (a) If the information al1eges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (I), the

48

state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish

49

probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection ( 1) has been committed

50

and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection ( 1)(b ), the state sha11 have

51

the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has

52

previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous

53

weapon.

54

(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection

5:S

(3 ). the court shall order that the defenclant be bound over and held to answer in the district

56

court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that [nll of the

57

+vi lowing co11ditio11s c.-.i.~t.] it would be contrarv to the best interest of the minor and to the
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~

public to bind over the defendant to the jurisdiction of the district court.

59
60

(c) In making the bind over determination in Subsection (3)(b). the judge shall consider
only the following:

61

(i) whether the minor has [not] been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense

62

involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult;

63

(ii) [that] if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether the

64

minor appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants; [and]

65
~

66

(iii) [that] the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was [not] committed in a
violent, aggressive, or premeditated manner[:t

67

(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile court; and

68

(v) whether public safetv is better served bv adjudicating the minor in the juvenile

69

court or in the district court.

70

showing of probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and

72

presenting evidence [as to the existence of the above conditions] that in light of the

73

considerations listed in Subsection (3)(c). it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor

74

and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district

75

court.
[fd-J]

W If the juvenile court judge finds by clear and convincing evidence that [alt-the

77

above ccmditions me satisfied,] it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the

78

best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court. the

79

court shall so state in its findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed

80

upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.

81

(j

[ftj) .(Ql Once the state has met its burden under [this] Subsection (3)W as to a

71

76
<$

H.B. 105

( 4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the

82

state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over

83

under Subsection ( 1), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor

84

and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.

85

( 5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of arrest shall issue.
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The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be

87

advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in

88

accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.

89

(6) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section,

90

the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of

91

probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant

92

committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the

93

additional considerations listed in Subsection (3)(b).

94

(7) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same

95

information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more

96

charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any

97

subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with

98

those charges, and where the court finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been

99

committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to

100
101

the district court to answer for those charges.
(8) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, the

102

jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court over the minor is

103

terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode,

104

and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against the minor, except as provided in

I 05

Subsection ( I 2).

106

(9) A minor who is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this

107

section or on whom an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a

I 08

preliminary examination in the district court.

109

( 10) Allegations contained in the indictment or information that the defendant has

110

previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous

III

weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need

112

to be proven at trial in the district court.

113

( I I) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty oL any of the charges filed or any
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114

other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over

115

the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.

116

(12) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-l 03 and the Division of Juvenile Justice

117

Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there

118

is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court.
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1

JUVENILE OFFENDER AMENDMENTS

2

2015 GENERAL SESSION

3

STATE OF UTAH

4

Chief Sponsor: Aaron Osmond

5

House Sponsor: V. Lowry Snow

6

7

LONGTITLE

8

General Description:

9

w

This bill makes changes to statutes regarding minors and courts.

IO

Highlighted Provisions:

11

This bill:

12

•

13

adds a specific list of previous offenses and conditions to the statute that allows for

the direct filing of charges in district court;

14

•

adds a new option to the serious youth offender statute;

15

•

creates guidelines for housing a minor convicted in district court in a juvenile secure

•

requires that the court detem,ine that a minor is knowingly and intentionally

16

17
18
19

facility;

waiving counsel: and
•

sets a presumption that juveniles are not to be shackled when appearing in court

20

unless ordered by the court.

21

Money Appropriated in this Bill:

22

21
24

26

None
()thrr Speria! (~Iauscs:
This bill provides a spcciai effective date.

AMENDS:

27

62 :\-7-2H l, as last amended by Laws of Utah 20 I 0, Chapter 38

28

?li.\-(1- 70 L as last amended by Laws of Utah 2014, Chapter 234

29

1 8.\-(J-702,

as last amended hy Laws of Utah 2014, Chapter 234
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78A-6-703, as last amended by Laws of Utah 2014, Chapter 234

31

78.-\-6-1111, as repealed and reenacted by Laws of Utah 2014, Chapter 275

32

ENACTS:

33

78A-6- I 22, Utah Code Annotated 1953

34

78A-6-705, Utah Code Annotated 1953

35
36

Be it enacted by the Legislature of the state of Utah:

37

Section 1. Section 62A-7-201 is amended to read:

38

62A-7-201. Confinement -- Facilities -- Restrictions.

39

(I) Children under 18 years of age, who are apprehended by any officer or brought

40

before any court for examination under any provision of state law, may not be confined in jails,

41

lockups, or cells used for persons 18 years of age or older who are charged with crime, or in

42

secure postadjudication correctional facilities operated by the division, except as provided in

43

Subsection (2), other specific statute, or in conformance with standards approved by the board.

44

(2) (a) Children charged with crimes under Section 78A-6-701, as a serious youth

45

offender under Section nA-6- 702 and bound over to the jurisdiction of the district court, or

46

certified to stand trial as an adult pursuant to Section 78A-(>- 703, if detained, shall be detained

47

[;11 c1jail 01 othc1 place ofdcte11ti011 used fo1 adults] as provided in these sections.

48

(b) Children detained in adult facilities under Section 78/\-6- 702 or 78/\-6- 703 prior to

49

a hearing before a magistrate, or under Subsection 78A-(l- I l 3(3), may only be held in certified

50

juvenile detention accommodations in accordance with rules promulgated by the division.

51

Those rules shall include standards for acceptable sight and sound separation from adult

52

inmates. The division certifies facilities that are in compliance with the division's standards.

53

The provisions of this Subsection (2)(h) do not apply to juveniles held in an adult detention

54

facility in accordance with Subsection (2)(a).

55

(3) In areas of low density population. the division may, by rule, approve juvenile

56

holding accommodations within adult facil!ties that han' acceptable sight and sound

::.,7

separation Those focilitie~ shall he used only for short-term holding purpose~. with a
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58

maximum confinement of six hours, for children alleged to have committed an act which

59

would be a criminal offense if committed by an adult. Acceptable short-tenn holding purposes

60

are: identification, notification of juvenile court officials, processing, and allowance of

61

adequate time for evaluation of needs and circumstances regarding release or transfer to a

62

shelter or detention facility. The provisions of this Subsection (3) do not apply to juveniles

63

held in an adult detention facility in accordance with Subsection (2)(a).

64

vP

offense if committed by an adult, may be detained in holding rooms in local law enforcement

66

agency facilities for a maximum of two hours, for identification or interrogation, or while

67

awaiting release to a parent or other responsible adult. Those rooms shall be ce1tified by the

68

division~ according to the division's mles. Those mles shall include provisions for constant

69

supervision and for sight and sound separation from adult inmates.

71

72

(5) Willful failure to comply with any of the provisions of this section is a class B

misdemeanor.
(6) (a) The division is responsible for the custody and detention of children under 18

73

years of age who require detention care prior to trial or examination, or while awaiting

74

assignment to a home or facility, as a dispositional placement under Subsection

75

78A-6-- I l 7(2)(f)(i) or 78A-6- I l OI (3)(a), and of youth offenders under Subsection

76

6~_,\- 7-504(8). The provisions of this Subsection (6)(a) do not apply to juveniles held in an

77

adult detention facility in accordance with Subsection (2)(a).

78

(b) The division shall provide standards for custody or detention under Subsections

79

(2)(b), (3), and (4), and shall determine and set standards for conditions of care and

80

confinement of children in detention facilities.

81

(jj

(4) Children who are alleged to have committed an act which would be a criminal

65

70

~
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( c) All other custody or detention shall be provided by the division, or by contract with

82
. .,
8.)

a public or private agency willing to undertake temporary custody or detention upon agreed

84

in law enforcement and corrections systems. The provisions of this Subsection (6)(c) do not

85

apply to _juveniles held in an adult detention facility in accordance with Subsection (2)(a) .

terms, or in suitable premises distinct and separate from the general jails, lockups, or cells used

...,
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Section 2. Section 78A-6-122 is enacted to read:

87

78A-6-122. Restraint of juveniles.

88

(1) As used in this section, "restrained" means the use of handcuffs, chains, shackles,

89

zip ties, irons. straightjackets. and any other device or method which may be used to

90

immobilize a juvenile.

91

(2) The Judicial Council shall adopt rules that address the circumstances under which a

92

juvenile may be restrained while appearing in court. The Judicial Council shall ensure that the

93

rules consider both the welfare of the juvenile and the safety of the court. A juvenile may not

94

be restrained during a court proceeding unless restraint is authorized by rules of the Judicial

95

Council.

96

Section 3. Section 78A-6-701 is amended to read:

97

78A-6-701. Jurisdiction of district court.

98

( 1) The district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over all persons 16 years of age

99

or older charged with:

100
101

102

(a) an offense which would be murder or aggravated murder if committed by an adult;
[or]
(b) [an offense which wottld be a felony if committed by an adult] if the minor has

I 03

been previously committed to a secure facility as defined in Section 62A-7-10 l [:-rhi-s

I 04

Subsection (l )(b) shall not apply if the offense is committed in a seem e facility. J, a felony

105

violation of:

l 06

(i) Section 76-(l- I 0.1, aggravated arson:

I 07

(ii) Section 76-5- l 03, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injmy to another;

108

(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnapping;

109

(iv) Section 76-6-203, aggravated burglary:

110

(v) Section 7()-<l-302, aggravated robbery~

111

(vi) Section

112

(vii) Section ··:(,. l (l .. ~rn~.

l l3

(viii) Section :·1,><~ 1 \L attempted aggravated murder: or

-✓-(:--~~,---!OS.

aggravated sexual assault;
i_,

felony discharge of a firearm;

-4Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Enrolled Copy

~

114

(ix) Section 76-5-203. attempted murder: or

115

( c) an offense other than those listed in Subsection ( 1)(b) involving the use of a

l 16

dangerous weapon, which would be a felony if committed by an adult. and the minor has been

117

previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon,

118

which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult.

119

(2) When the district court has exclusive original jurisdiction over a minor under this

120

section, it also has exclusive original jurisdiction over the minor regarding all offenses joined

121

with the qualifying offense, and any other offenses, including misdemeanors, arising from the

122

same criminal episode. The district court is not divested of jurisdiction by virtue of the fact

123

that the minor is allowed to enter a plea to, or is found guilty of, a lesser or joined offense.

124

(3) (a) Any felony, misdemeanor, or infraction committed after the offense over which

125

the district court takes jurisdiction under Subsection ( 1) or (2) shall be tried against the

126

defendant as an adult in the district court or justice court havingjurisdiction.

127

(b) If the qualifying charge under Subsection (1) results in an acquittal, a finding of not

128

guilty, or a dismissal of the charge in the district court, the juvenile court under Section

129

78A-6- l 03 and the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regain any jurisdiction and authority

130

previously exercised over the minor.

131

( 4) A minor anested under this section shall be held in a juvenile detention facility

132

until the district court detennines where the minor shall be held until the time of trial, except

133

for defendants who arc otherwise subject to the authority of the Board of Pardons and Parole.

134

(5) The district court shall consider the following when determining where the minor

135

~

S.B. 167

will be held until the time of trial:

136

(a) the age of the minor;

137

(b) the nature~ seriousness. and circumstances of the alleged offense:

138

(c) the minor's history of prior criminal acts;

139

(d) whether detention in a juvenile detention facility will adequately serve the need for

140

141

community protection pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings;
(e) ,:vhcther the minor's placement in a _juvenile detention faciiity wili negatively impact
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142

the functioning of the facility by compromising the goals of the facility to maintain a safe,

143

positive, and secure environment for all minors within the facility;

(f) the relative ability of the facility to meet the needs of the minor and protect the

144
145

146
147

public;
(g) whether the minor presents an imminent risk of hann to the minor or others within
thefacility;

148

(h) the physical maturity of the minor;

149

(i) the cunent mental state of the minor as evidenced by relevant mental health or

150

psychological assessments or screenings that are made available to the court; and

151

U) any other factors the court considers relevant.

152

(6) A minor ordered to a juvenile detention facility under Subsection (5) shall remain

153
154
155
156

in the facility until released by a district court judge, or if convicted, until sentencing.
(7) A minor held in a juvenile detention facility under this section shall have the same
right to bail as any other criminal defendant.
(8) If the minor ordered to a juvenile detention facility under Subsection (5) attains the

157

age of 18 years, the minor shall be transferred within 30 days to an adult jail until released by

158

the district court judge, or if convicted, until sentencing.

159

(9) A minor 16 years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers the safety

160

or welfare of others in the juvenile detention facility may, by court order that specifies the

161

reasons, be detained in another place of confinement considered appropriate by the court,

162

including jail or other place of pretrial confinement for adults.

163

Section 4. Section 78A-6-702 is amended to read:

164

78A-6-702. Serious youth offender -- Procedure.

165

(I) Any action filed by a county attorney, district attorney, or attorney general charging

166

a minor 16 years of age or older with a felony [smrlt] may be by criminal infomrntion and filed

167

in the juvenile court if the minor was a principal actor in the offense and the information

168

charges any of the follmving offenses:

169

(a) any felony violation of:

t:t\

lill!!il
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(i) Section 76-6-103, aggravated arson;

171

(ii) Section 76-5-103, aggravated assault resulting in serious bodily injury to another;

172

(iii) Section 76-5-302, aggravated kidnapping;

173

(iv) Section 7(>-(>-203, aggravated burglary;

l 74

(v) Section 76-6-302, aggravated robbery;

175

(vi) Section 76-5-405, aggravated sexual assault;

176

(vii) Section 76-10-508.1, felony discharge of a firearm;

177

(viii) Section 76-5<W2, attempted aggravated murder; or

178

(ix) Section 76-5-~03, attempted murder; or

179

(b) an offense other than those listed in Subsection ( 1)(a) involving the use of a

180

dangerous weapon, which would be a felony if committed by an adult, and the minor has been

181

previously adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous weapon,

182

which also would have been a felony if committed by an adult.

183
184

(2) All proceedings before the juvenile court related to charges filed under Subsection

( 1) shall be conducted in conformity with the rules established by the Utah Supreme Court.

185

(3) (a) If the information alleges the violation of a felony listed in Subsection (1 ), the

186

state shall have the burden of going forward with its case and the burden of proof to establish

187

probable cause to believe that one of the crimes listed in Subsection (1) has been committed

188

and that the defendant committed it. If proceeding under Subsection ( 1)(b ), the state shall have

189

the additional burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant has

I 90

previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous

191

weapon.

192

(ii)

S.B. 167

(b) If the juvenile court judge finds the state has met its burden under this Subsection

193

(3 ), the court shall order that the defendant be bound over and held to answer in the district

194

court in the same manner as an adult unless the juvenile court judge finds that it would be

195

contrary to the best interest of the minor and to the public to bind over the defendant to the

196

jurisdiction of the district court.

197

(c) In making the bind over dete1111ination in Subsection (3 )(b). the judge shall consider
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198
199

only the following:
(i) whether the minor has been previously adjudicated delinquent for an offense

200

involving the use of a dangerous weapon which would be a felony if committed by an adult;

20 I

(ii) if the offense was committed with one or more other persons, whether the minor

202
203
204

appears to have a greater or lesser degree of culpability than the codefendants;
(iii) the extent to which the minor's role in the offense was committed in a violent,
aggressive, or premeditated manner;

205

(iv) the number and nature of the minor's prior adjudications in the juvenile court; and

206

(v) whether public safety [is] and the interests of the minor are better served by

207

adjudicating the minor in the juvenile court or in the district court, including whether the

208

resources of the adult svstem or juvenile system are more likely to assist in rehabilitating the

209

minor and reducing the threat which the minor presents to the public.

210

(d) Once the state has met its burden under Subsection (3)(a) as to a showing of

211

probable cause, the defendant shall have the burden of going forward and presenting evidence

212

that in light of the considerations listed in Subsection (3 )( c ), it would be contrary to the best

213

interest of the minor and the best interests of the public to bind the defendant over to the

214

jurisdiction of the district court.

215

( e) If the juvenile court judge finds by [cleat and com iuci11g] a preponderance of

216

evidence that it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor and the best interests of the

217

public to bind the defendant over to the jurisdiction of the district court, the court shall so state

218

in its findings and order the minor held for trial as a minor and shall proceed upon the

219

information as though it were a juvenile petition.

220

(4) If the juvenile court judge finds that an offense has been committed, but that the

221

state has not met its burden of proving the other criteria needed to bind the defendant over

222

under Subsection ( 1), the juvenile court judge shall order the defendant held for trial as a minor

223

and shall proceed upon the information as though it were a juvenile petition.

224
225

(5) At the time of a bind over to district court a criminal warrant of anest shall issue.
The defendant shall have the same right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be
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advised of that right by the juvenile court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in

227

accordance with Title 77, Chapter 20, Bail.
(6) At the time the minor is bound over to the district court, the juvenile court shall

228
229

make the initial deten11ination on where the minor shall be held.

230
23 I

(7) The juvenile court shall consider the following when determining where the minor
shall be held until the time of trial:

232

(a) the age of the minor;

233

(b) the nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the alleged offense;

234

( c) the minor's history of prior criminal acts;

235

(d) whether detention in a juvenile detention facility will adequately serve the need for

236

community protection pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings;

23 7

(e) whether the minor's placement in a juvenile detention facility will negatively impact

23 8

the functioning of the facility by compromising the goals of the facility to maintain a safe,

239

positive, and secure environment for all minors within the facility;

(f) the relative ability of the facility to meet the needs of the minor and protect the

240
241

242
243

(g) whether the minor presents an imminent risk of hann to the minor or others within
the facility;

244

(h) the physical maturity of the minor;

245

(i) the cuITent mental state of the minor as evidenced by relevant mental health or

246

psychological assessments or screenings that are made available to the comt; and

24 7

U) any other factors the court considers relevant.

248

(8) If a minor is ordered to a juvenile detention facility under Subsection (7), the minor

249

shall remain in the facility until released by a district court judge, or if convicted~ until

250

sentencing.

251
@

public;

252
253

(9) A minor held in a juvenile detention facility under this section shall have the same
right to bail as any other criminal defendant.
( l 0) Jf the minor ordered to a juveniie detention facility under Subsection (7) attains
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the age of 18 years, the minor shall be transfen-ed within 30 days to an adult jail until released

255

by the district court judge, or if convicted, until sentencing.

256

(11) A minor I 6 years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers the safety

257

or welfare of others in the juvenile detention facility may, by com1 order that specifies the

258

reasons, be detained in another place of pretrial confinement considered appropriate by the

259

court, including jail or other place of confinement for adults.

260

261
262

( 12) The district court may reconsider the decision on where the minor will be held

pursuant to Subsection (6).
( 13) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury charging a violation under this section,

263

the preliminary examination held by the juvenile court judge need not include a finding of

264

probable cause that the crime alleged in the indictment was committed and that the defendant

265

committed it, but the juvenile court shall proceed in accordance with this section regarding the

266

additional considerations listed in Subsection (3 )(b ).

267

(14) When a defendant is charged with multiple criminal offenses in the same

268

information or indictment and is bound over to answer in the district court for one or more

269

charges under this section, other offenses arising from the same criminal episode and any

270

subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against him shall be considered together with

271

those charges, and where the com1 finds probable cause to believe that those crimes have been

272

committed and that the defendant committed them, the defendant shall also be bound over to

273

the district court to answer for those charges.

274

( 15) When a minor has been bound over to the district court under this section, the

275

jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the juvenile court over the minor is

276

terminated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the same criminal episode,

277

and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against the minor~ except as provided in

278

Subsection ( 19) or Section -;'~:.,\-()- 705.

279

( 16) A minor \Vho is bound over to answer as an adult in the district court under this

280

section or on \Vhorn an indictment has been returned by a grand jury is not entitled to a

281

nrcliminar~, examination in the district court.
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(] 7) Allegations contained in the indictment or infomrntion that the defendant has

283

previously been adjudicated or convicted of an offense involving the use of a dangerous

284

weapon, or is 16 years of age or older, are not elements of the criminal offense and do not need

285

to be proven at trial in the district court.

286

( 18) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of, any of the charges filed or any

287

other offense arising from the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction over

288

the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.

289

(19) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6-103 and the Division of Juvenile Justice

290

Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there

291

is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court.

292

Section 5. Section 78A-6-703 is amended to read:

293

78A-6-703. Certification hearings -- Juvenile court to hold preliminary hearing --

294
295

Factors considered by juvenile court for waiver of jurisdiction to district court.
(1) If a criminal information filed in accordance with Subsection 78A-6-602(3) alleges

296

the commission of an act which would constitute a felony if committed by an adult, the

297

juvenile court shall conduct a preliminary hearing.

298
299
300

301
302
303
304

(2) At the preliminary hearing the state shall have the burden of going forward with its
case and the burden of establishing:
(a) probable cause to believe that a crime was committed and that the defendant
committed it; and
(b) by a preponderance of the evidence, that it would be contrary to the best interests of
the minor or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction.
(3) ln considering whether or not it would be contrary to the best interests of the minor

305

or of the public for the juvenile court to retain jurisdiction, the juvenile court shall consider,

306

and may base its decision on, the finding of one or more of the following factors:

307
308

309

(a) the seriousness of the offense and whether the protection of the community requires

isolation of the minor beyond that afforded by juvenile facilities;

(b) whether the alleged offense was committed hy the minor under circumstances
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310

which would subject the minor to enhanced penalties under Section 76-3-203. I if the minor

311

were adult and the offense was committed:

312

(i) in concert with two or more persons;

313

(ii) for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with any criminal street gang

314
315
316
317

3 I8
319

320
321
322

as defined in Section 76-9-802; or
(iii) to gain recognition, acceptance, membership, or increased status with a criminal
street gang as defined in Section 76-9-802;
(c) whether the alleged offense was committed in an aggressive, violent, premeditated,
or willful manner;
(d) whether the alleged offense was against persons or property, greater weight being

given to offenses against persons, except as provided in Section 76-8-418;
(e) the maturity of the minor as detem1ined by considerations of the minor's home,
environment, emotional attitude, and pattern of living;

323

(t) the record and previous history of the minor;

324

(g) the likelihood of rehabilitation of the minor by use of facilities available to the

325
326

juvenile court;
(h) the desirability of trial and disposition of the entire offense in one court when the

327

minor's associates in the alleged offense are adults who will be charged with a crime in the

328

district court;

329

(i) ,:vhether the minor used a firearm in the commission of an offense; and

330

U) whether the minor possessed a dangerous weapon on or about school premises as

331
332

333
334
335
336
337

provided in Section 76-10-505 .5.
( 4) The amount of weight to be given to each of the factors listed in Subsection (3) is

discretionary with the court.
(5) (a) Written reports and other materials relating to the minor's mental, physical,
educational, and social history may be considered by the court.
(b) If requested by the minor, the minor's parent, guardian, or other interested party, the

court shall require the person or agency preparing the report and other material to appear and

- 12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Enrolled Copy
338
~

be subject to both direct and cross-examination.

339

(6) At the conclusion of the state's case, the minor may testify under oath, call

340

witnesses, cross-examine adverse witnesses, and present evidence on the factors required by

341

Subsection (3).

(7) At the time the minor is bound over to the district court, the juvenile court shall

342
343

make the initial determination on where the minor shall be held.

(8) The juvenile court shall consider the following when determining where the minor

344
345

~
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will be held until the time of trial:

346

(a) the age of the minor;

347

(b) the nature, seriousness, and circumstances of the alleged offense;

348

(c) the minoes history of prior criminal acts;

349

(d) whether detention in a juvenile detention facility will adequately serve the need for

350

community protection pending the outcome of any criminal proceedings;
( e) whether the minor's placement in a juvenile detention facility will negatively impact

351
352

the functioning of the facility by compromising the goals of the facility to maintain a safe,

353

positive, and secure environment for all minors within the facility;

(t) the relative ability of the facility to meet the needs of the minor and protect the

354
355
356
357

public;
(g) whether the minor presents an imminent risk of hann to the minor or others within
the facility;

358

(h) the physical maturity of the minor;

359

(i) the cun-ent mental state of the minor as evidenced by relevant mental health or

360

psychological assessments or screenings that are made available to the court; and

361

(i) any other factors the court considers relevant.

362

(9) If a minor is ordered to a juvenile detention facility under Subsection (8), the minor

363

shall remain in the facility until released by a district court judge, or if convicted~ until

364

sentencing.

365

( 10) A minor held in a juvenile detention facility under this section shall have the same
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366

right to bail as any other criminal defendant.
( 11) If the minor ordered to a juvenile detention facility under Subsection (8) attains

367
368

the age of 18 years, the minor shall be transferred within 30 days to an adult jail until released

369

by the district court judge, or if convicted, until sentencing.

3 70

(12) A minor 16 years of age or older whose conduct or condition endangers the safety

371

or welfare of others in the juvenile detention facility may, by com1 order that specifies the

372

reasons, be detained in another place of confinement considered appropriate by the court,

373

including jail or other place of confinement for adults.

374

375

(13) The district court may reconsider the decision on where the minor shall be held
pursuant to Subsection (7).
(14) If the court finds the state has met its burden under Subsection (2), the court may

376

377

enter an order:

378

(a) certifying that finding; and

3 79

(b) directing that the minor be held for criminal proceedings in the district court.

380

( 15) If an indictment is returned by a grand jury, the preliminary examination held by

381

the juvenile court need not include a finding of probable cause, but the juvenile court shall

382

proceed in accordance with this section regarding the additional consideration referred to in

383

Subsection (2)(b).
(16) The provisions of Section 78A-6- I l 5, Section 78A-6- l 1 I 1, and other provisions

384

385

reiating to proceedings in juvenile cases are applicable to the hearing held under this section to

386

the extent they are pertinent.

3 87
388

( 17) A minor who has been directed to be held for criminal proceedings in the district
court is not entitled to a preliminary examination in the district court.

389

( 18) A minor who has been certified for trial in the district court shall have the same

390

right to bail as any other criminal defendant and shall be advised of that right by the juvenile

391

court judge. The juvenile court shall set initial bail in accordance with Title 77 Chapter 20,

392

Bail.

393

1

( l 9) When a minor has been certified to the district court under this section, the
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394

jurisdiction of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services and the jurisdiction of the juvenile

395

court over the minor is tenninated regarding that offense, any other offenses arising from the

396

same criminal episode, and any subsequent misdemeanors or felonies charged against the

397

minor, except as provided in Subsection (21) or Section 78A-6- 705.

398

(20) If a minor enters a plea to, or is found guilty of any of the charges filed or on any

399

other offense arising out of the same criminal episode, the district court retains jurisdiction

400

over the minor for all purposes, including sentencing.

401

(21) The juvenile court under Section 78A-6- l03 and the Division of Juvenile Justice

402

Services regain jurisdiction and any authority previously exercised over the minor when there

403

is an acquittal, a finding of not guilty, or dismissal of all charges in the district court.

404

Section 6. Section 78A-6-705 is enacted to read:

405

78A-6-705. Youth prison commitment.

406

( l) Before sentencing a minor who is under the jurisdiction of the district court under

407

Section 78A-6- 70 I, 78A-6-702. or 78A-6-703, to prison the court shall request a report from

408

the Division of Juvenile Justice Services regarding the potential risk to other juveniles if the

409

minor were to be committed to the custody of the division. The division shall submit the

410

requested report to the court as part of the pre-sentence report or as a separate rep011.

411

(2) If. after receiving the report described in Subsection (I). the court detem1ines that

412

probation is not appropriate and commitment to prison is an appropriate sentence, the court

413

shall order the minor committed to prison and the minor shall be provisionally housed in a

414

secure facility operated bv the Division of Juvenile Justice Services until the minor reaches 18

415

years of age, unless released earlier from incarceration by the Board of Pardons and Parole.

416
417

418
419

(3) The court may order the minor committed directly to the custody of the Department
of Corrections if the court finds that:

(a) the minor would present an unreasonable risk to others while in the division's
custodv:

420

(b) the minor has previously been committed to a prison for adult offenders: or

421

1c) housing the minor in a secure facility operated bv the Division of Juvenile Justice
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Services would be contrary to the interests of justice.
(4) The Division of Juvenile Justice Services shall adopt procedures by rule, pursuant

424

to Title 63G, Chapter 3, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act. regarding the transfer of a

425

minor provisionally housed in a division facility under Subsection (2) to the custody of the

426

Department of Corrections. If. in accordance with those rules, the division detennines that

427

housing the minor in a division facility presents an umeasonable risk to others or that it is not

428

in the best interest of the minor, it shall transfer the physical custody of the minor to the

429

Department of Corrections.

430

(5) When a minor is committed to prison but ordered by a comt to be housed in a

431

Division of Juvenile Justice Services facility under this section, the court and the division shall

432

immediately notify the Board of Pardons and Parole so that the minor may be scheduled for a

433

hearing according to board procedures. If a minor who is provisionallv housed in a division

434

facility under this section has not been paroled or otherwise released from incarceration by the

435

time the minor reaches 18 years of age. the division shall as soon as reasonably possible. but

436

not later than when the minor reaches 18 years and 6 months of age, transfer the minor to the

43 7

physical custody of the Department of Corrections.

438

(6) Upon the commitment of a minor to the custody of the Division of Juvenile Justice

439

Services or the Department of Corrections under this section. the Board of Pardons and Parole

440

has authority over the minor for purposes of parole. pardon, commutation, tennination of

441

sentence, remission of fines or forfeitures. orders of restitution, and all other purposes

442

authorized by law.

443

(7) The Youth Parole Authority may hold hearings, receive reports, or otherwise keep

444

infom1ed of the progress of a minor in the custody of the Division of Juvenile Justice Services

445

under this section and may forward to the Board of Pardons and Parole anv infonnation or

446

recommendations concerning the minor.

447
448
449

{8) Commitment of a minor under this section is a prison commitment for all

sentencing purposes.
Section 7. Section 78A-6-11 ll is amended to read:
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78A-6-1111. Right to counsel -- Appointment of counsel for indigent -- Costs.

451

(1) (a) In any action in juvenile court initiated by the state, a political subdivision of the

452

state, or a private party, the parents, legal guardian, and the minor, where applicable, shall be

453

informed that they may be represented by counsel at every stage of the proceedings.

454
455
456

(b) In any action initiated by a private party, the parents or legal guardian shall have the
right to employ counsel of their own choice at their own expense.
(c) If, in any action initiated by the state or a political subdivision of the state under

457

Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings; Part 5, Termination of Parental Rights

458

Act; or Part I 0, Adult Offenses, of this chapter or under Section 78A-6- l l 0 I, a parent or legal

459

guardian requests an attorney and is found by the court to be indigent, counsel shall be

460

appointed by the court to represent the parent or legal guardian in all proceedings directly

461

related to the petition or motion filed by the state, or a political subdivision of the state, subject

462

to the provisions of this section.

463

~
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(d) In any action initiated by the state, a political subdivision of the state, or a private

464

party under Part 3, Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency Proceedings, or Part 5, Tem1ination of

465

Parental Rights Act, of this chapter, the child shall be represented by a guardian ad litem in

466

accordance with Sections 78A-6-317 and 781\-6-902. The child shall also be represented by an

467

attorney guardian ad litem in other actions initiated under this chapter when appointed by the

468

court under Section ·~s:\-6-902 or as otherwise provided by law.

469

( e) In any action initiated by the state or a political subdivision of the state under Part

4 70

6, Delinquency and Criminal Actions. or Part 7, Transfer of .Jurisdiction, of this chapter, or

4 71

against a minor under Section 7~/\-()- I l (l I~ the parents or legal guardian and the minor shall be

4 72

informed that the minor [may] has the right to be represented by counsel at every stage of the

4 73

proceedings [and that ifl

474

(i) In cases where a minor is facing a felony level offense, the court shall appoint

475

counsel. who shall appear until counsel is retained on the minor's behalf. The minor mav not

476

waive counsel unless the minor has had a meanin2:ful opportunitv to consult with a defense

4 77

attornev. The court shall make findings nn the record. takin!~_into consideration the minor's
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unique circumstances and attributes. that the waiver is lmowing and voluntary and the minor

479

understands the consequences of waiving the right to counsel.

480

{ii) In all other situations the right to counsel may not be waived by a minor unless

481

there has been a finding on the record, taking into consideration the minor's unique

482

circumstances and attributes, that the waiver is lmowing and voluntary, and the minor

483

understands the consequences of waiving the right to counsel.

484

(iii) If the minor is found to be indigent, counsel shall be appointed by the court to

485

represent the minor in all proceedings directly related to the petition or motion filed by the state

486

or a political subdivision of the state, subject to the provisions of this section.

487

(f) lndigency of a parent, legal guardian, or minor shall be determined in accordance

488

with the process and procedure defined in Section 77-32-'202. The court shall take into account

489

the income and financial ability of the parent or legal guardian to retain counsel in determining

490

the indigency of the minor.

491

(g) The cost of appointed counsel for a party found to be indigent, including the cost of

492

counsel and expense of the first appeal, shall be paid by the county in which the trial court

493

proceedings are held. Counties may levy and collect taxes for these purposes.

494

(2) Counsel appointed by the comi may not provide representation as court-appointed

495

counsel for a parent or legal guardian in any action initiated by, or in any proceeding to modify

496

court orders in a proceeding initiated by, a private party.

497

(3) If the county responsible to provide legal counsel for an indigent under Subsection

498

( 1)(g) has arranged by contract to provide services, the court shall appoint the contracting

499

attorney as legal counsel to represent that indigent.

500

(4) The court may order a parent or legal guardian for whom counsel is appointed, and

50 I

the parents or legal guardian of any minor for whom counsel is appointed, to reimburse the

502

county for the cost of appointed counsel.

503

(5) The state, or an agency of the state, may not be ordered to reimburse the county for

504

expenses inctUTed under Subsection ( I )(g).

505

Section 8. Effective date.
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Section 78A-6-122 takes effect October I. 2015.
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AddendumD

IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

I
I

! FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF

STATE OF UTAH,

LAW AND ORDER ON BIND OVER

Plaintiff,
vs.

Case Number: 100344 7

COOPER VAN HUIZEN,

Judge: Michelle E Heward

Defendant.

This matter came before the court for a preliminary hearing/examination and a
subsequent best interest hearing, on December 20, 2013. The State was present and represented

by Brody E. Flint, Deputy Weber County Attorney. The Defendant was present and represented
by his attorney, Rex Bray; co-defendant Josh Parley Dutson was present and represented by
counsel, Mary Ann Ellis. The Court heard evidence from all parties and being fully apprised,
now makes the following:
FINDINGS OFFACT

1.

The State met its burden and the court finds probable cause to believe that the

crimes listed in the Information, two aggravated robberies and one aggravated burglary, occurred
as alleged.
2.

Further, there is probable cause to believe that Cooper Van Huizcn committed fr,.:.

offenses ullegcd in the Information.

The Dcfendan.t lias

11\)

prior record in the juvenile court.

JAN 2. :1. 211:-'i
-

JUVENILE COURT

SF:COND JUDICIAL D1Srn 1r:,
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4.

These offenses were committed with other co-defendants. The Court therefore

considers the Defendant's degree of culpability in comparison to the other co-defendants, and
finds that his culpability was significant.
a.

Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was less at the scene of the crime than

others. There is insufficient evidence that he brandished a gun or switchblade knife
during the commission of the burglary or robberies although he was present and assisted
in the forced entrance into the home with co-defendants.

b.

Mr. Van Huizen's involvement was to plan and facilitate the robberies.

Specifically the guns used were guns from Mr. Van Huizen's home. Mr. Van Huizen
provided the guns knowing they would be used in the burglary and robberies.
Mr. Van Huizen's assistance in the robbery ensured that the other co-

C.

defendants would have guns to use when breaking into the home and robbing the persons
therein.

5.

Mr. Van Huizen's role in the offense was committed in a violent, aggressive, or

premeditated manner.

a.

These offenses were committed with guns and threats of violence. The

guns belonged to Mr. Van Huizen and were provided knowing they would be used in the
burglary and robberies. This planning occurred over a period of time and was not a spur

of the moment decision.

point into one of the most protected and sacred areas in our society, the home.
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c.

The violence committed in the home was facilitated by Mr. Van Huizen's

planning and preparation. Mr. Van Huizen knew that the guns were intended to be used
in a burglary and robbery for drugs.
Mr. Van Huizen's presence in the home, by itself, was a threat to the

d.

victims and a danger to others who were in or could have come into the home.

6.

This is Mr. Van Huizen's first offense in juvenile court.

7.

Public safety is better served by adjudicating the minor in the district court.

Mr. Van Huizen is 16 years old and juvenile court jurisdiction is limited

a.

until the age of 21; the district court's jurisdiction is not limited.
b.

The involvement of drugs, violence, firearms, and forcing entry into a

home to commit robberies places these offenses among the most serious in our
commwlity.

c.

The likelihood of harm to others was great given the facts of this case.

People understandably react violently to such acts of aggression, particularly when they
occur in the home. Acts of this nature are extremely volatile and can easily lead to even
fatal harm to law enforcement and other members of the public.
d.

Public safety requires a strong response and longer correctional period

than is available in the juvenile court.
e.

The defense provided evidence of a loving family and guod home. Thr:

works against him in this case. Despite the benefits of that home he chose to engage in
violent and irresponsible acts that put the safety of members of the public at grave risk.
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8.

The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it would be contrary to the

best interest of the Defendant to bind him over to the jurisdiction of the district court.
9.

The defense has not shown, however, by clear and convincing evidence, that it is

in the best interest of the public for this case to be adjudicated in juvenile court. The court finds
that it is contrary to the best interests of the public to allow the case to remain in juvenile court.
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court enters the following
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW & ORDER
The Defendant should be and hereby is bound over to the district court for further
proceedings on the Information.

An arrest warrant has issued and bail has been set.

DATED t h i s ~ day of January, 2014.

BY THE COURT:

,$j;
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Addendum E

-1 IN THE SECOND DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT
OF WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

)
)
)
)
)

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
vs.

) Case No. 1003447
}

COOPER VANHUIZEN,

}

________________
Defendant.

)
)
)

Preliminary Hearing
Electronically Recorded on
December 20, 2013
BEFORE: THE HONORABLE MICHELLE HEWARD
Second District Juvenile Court Judge
APPEARANCES
For the State:

Brody E. Flint
WEBER COUNTY ATTORNEY
2380 Washington Blvd. :230
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: ( 801) 399-8377

For the Defendant:

Maryanne Ellis
2564 Washington Blvd fflOl
Ogden, UT 84401
Telephone: (801)334-9537
Rex Bray
PO Box 321
Sandy, UT 84091
Telephone: (801) 553-1121

Transcribed by: Natalie Lake, CCT

152 E. Katresha St.
Grantsville, ll'I' 84029

Telephcne:

@

1435J

590-5575
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@

@

I think in my meeting with CVH there at the detention

2

center,

3

straight.

4

a first -- 1 st Degree Felonies,

5

can in fact be treated and rehabilitated,

6

a productive member of society,

7

again ask the Court to please keep them in the juvenile court

8

system rather than transferring this case to district court.

9

Thank you.

10

I believe this has worked as an example of scaring kids
It is a first offense, but it's egregious.

THE COURT:

Thank you.

I -- it is

yet I still believe in him that he
that he can in fact be

your Honor, and we would once

The Court is going to take a

11

break.

I will rule today so that you will have my decision

12

today.

I'm going to shoot for 20 minutes, about a quarter to 3.

13

We'll be back at that time.

14

MS. ELLIS:

All right.

Thank you.

Thank you.

15

(Short recess taken)

16

THE COURT:

17

COURT CLERK:

18

THE COURT:

Do I have the record?
Yes.
Thank you.

We're back on the record in the

19

CVH and JPD matters.

20

extra time.

2 J_

m;n~tes now acd get chis t~ke~ care of as opposed

22

come bac~ nexc week sometime to make the decision.

I appreciate the

your patience with the

I figured it's better for me to take a few more
Lv

having you

23

The defense has had the burden in the second portion of

24

this hearing today proving by clear and convincing evidence that

25

it is contrary to the best interest of the minor and the best

··"'Jf1
f.J}•.,

®
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interest of the public to bind the defendants over to the

2

jurisdiction of the district court.

3

The Court wants to make sure that I'm making a record

4

that is clear for both of the defendants individually and not

5

placing them together.

6

questions with regard to the findings as I go through here that

7

you ask questions if I'm not clear with regard to each of your

8

clients and to the State's interest so that I can make sure that

9

that record is clear, and I'll attempt to do that.

10

Counsel,

I' 11 ask if there are any

The Court has considered the five statutory factors that

11

are set forth in 78A-6-702 (3) (c).

12

stipulation has been found to go in favor of each of the

13

defendants.

14

juvenile court that are of any significance here.

15

The first of those factors by

Neither one of them have prior records here in the

The second factor is whether the offenses were committed

16

with one or more persons -- I'm sorry,

17

committed with one or more persons,

18

whether each of the minor's involvement,

19

had a greater or lesser degree of culpability than their co-

20

defendants.

2 J_

With r~garri

t0

~r.

J?D,

these offenses were

so the Court considers
whether each of them

cne Court finds that his role

in carrying out the offenses was one of planning and pulling
p&cple togEtheE.

The evid~nce before the Court shows that the

24

culpability of Mr. JPD both before and during the actual offense

25

shows that he had culpability.

,·,7 ,.,

l. ...")· ' l.'
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@

He was involved in acquiring guns prior to the robbery,

2

with the knowledge that they would be used in the robbery.

3

was in a place to use those weapons to gain entry.

4

he was in on the plan to use the weapons to gain entry into the

5

home,

6

people within the home.

He

I'm sorry,

and to take what he and his co-defendants wanted from the

7

While the Court does not find that he pointed a gun at

8

either of the victims -- I'm just not sure what happened there --

9

but I do find that that was done by two of the -- the two adults

10

that were involved.

11

culpability in insuring that that would happen, that the people

12

that he was with would pull guns and use them after breaking into

13

the home.

14

Mr. JPD's involvement had a high degree of

With regard to Mr. CVH,

the Court finds that his

15

involvement was less in terms of his physical involvement at the

16

scene.

17

have insufficient evidence to determine whether he had a

18

switch -- the switchblade that had been referred to by others

19

that have testified here today.

20

I don't have evidence that he brandished a gun, and I

His involvement was in planning and facilitating the

?l
These were his guns fcorn his horn~,
F:C.?.,~r1ec cut

i:i terms

of how

the

and this was w~ll

guns ,,ould be used.

So in terms

24

of the second factor,

25

each of the -- each of these defendants was significant in terms

the Court finds that the involvement of

. ~;

·,

~~:
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of the offenses.

2

Whether the role -- the third factor as the extent of

3

the minor's role in

4

or premeditated manner.

5

been -- already been referred to by the Court.

6

spur of the moment,

7

reaction.

8

robberies and the burglary.

9

was it committed in a violent,

aggressive

The premeditation in these offenses has
This was not a

a dumb or a childish decision,

a quick

Both defendants were involved in planning the

There were multiple steps that were carried out prior to

10

actually going out to the home.

11

time,

12

themselves from the offenses,

13

were violent and aggressive offenses with the use of guns and

14

threats,

15

in our society,

This took place over a period of

giving both of the defendants ample opportunity to retract

16

but they chose not to do so.

These

going inside one of the most protected and sacred places
the home.

The violence that was employed,

albeit by others in

17

terms of pulling the guns, was made possible by Mr. CVH and

18

facilitated by Mr. JPD.

19

Mr. CVH and the planning or pulling together of the parties and

20

facilitation by Mr.

JPD,

In addition to providing the guns by

they both -- both of these defendants

?1
:hat

t~~r

were wlch who w~re using guns,

and their physical

presence -- I'm talking abouc the defendant's physical presence

24

was a threat when the offense took place.

25

the roles of both JPD and CVH to have been involved involved

The Court finds that
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@

violence, aggression and were premeditated.
The number and nature -- the next factor is the number

3

and nature of prior adjudications in the juvenile court.

4

Court finds that those again go in favor of the defendants here.

5

They do not have violent -- or they do not have records of any

6

significance here in the juvenile court.

7

The

The fifth factor is whether public safety is better

8

served by adjudicating the minors in the juvenile court or in the

9

district court.

The Court believes that public safety would be

10

better served in both of these cases by adjudicating them in the

11

district court.

12

They are older juveniles, 16 and 17-years of age.

13

The extent of the juvenile court's involvement is limited until

14

the age -- is limited to the age of 21.

15

jurisdiction is not limited.

16

the involvement of drugs,

17

firearms and forcibly entering into a home where people therein

18

were robbed places the offense amongst the most serious in our

19

community.

20

when given the facts of this case.

The district court's

While these were first offenses,

violence, particularly the use of

The likelihood of further injury and harm is great
Society deserves to be

2]
The Cou=t does
'J .-

find ths~ the dsfense has sno~~ that ic

L... ..;,

is contra=; to the best interest cf the minors to bi~d them ever

24

to the jurisdiction of the district court.

There are more

rehabilitative services that are available in the juvenile system
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than in the adult system.

2

defendants appear to have loving families and homes that they

3

have come from.

4

succeed,

5

capabilities.

6

nor the positive skill sets that I think both of them have,

7

chose not to use those in this situation.

8

9

Both of the minors, both of the

They have had opportunities in the past to

and they have skill sets that show that they have many
They chose not to use those.

Either the support
they

So the Court finds that the defense has not met its
burden of proving that it is contrary to the best interest of the

10

minor and the best interest of the public to bind the defendants

11

over to the jurisdiction of the juvenile court.

12

that I've said that right.

13

of proving it is contrary to the minor's best interest,

14

defense has met its burden of showing that it's in the best

15

interest of the public in this inter

16

matter is bound over to the district court.

17

Let me make sure

While the defense has met the burden

On a personal note,

neither

in this instance,

and the

this is not the way that I would

18

want any young man to start his majority with serious offenses

19

in the adult system.

20

your actions,

It's tough to be held accountable for

but I also think that it's necessary -- that
Y0~ still both have a

2~

fr~nt of yo~.

and i t !s the Court's hope that you use chis

23

experience to do

24

future as you move forward.

25

lcl ~! years

make better decisions and choices in the

That being said,

I need arrest warrants here.

Does the
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State -- has the State prepared those?

2

MR. FLINT:

I have it prepared right here, your Honor.

3

THE COURT:

You do have them prepared?

4

MR. FLINT:

I'm just signing it.

5

THE COURT:

Okay.

6

issue of bail.

7

bail?

8
9

Does the State have a request with regard to

MR. FLINT:

No, your Honor.

I just think the standard

bail is appropriate here.

10
11

The Court does need to address the

THE COURT:
an adult.

12

I don't know what the standard bail is for

May I?
MR. FLINT:

Standard bail is I'm told for 1• t Degree

13

Felonies, is 20,000 bondable.

14

$60,000 bail would be standard.

So 20,000 for each charge would be

15

THE COURT:

So 60,000?

16

MR. FLINT:

Uh-huh.

17

THE COURT:

Ms. Ellis, do you wish to be heard on the

18

jssue of bail?

19

MS. ELLIS:

Your Honor, we would ask for a reduced bail

20

for JPD.

21

5n~~rceral9d for two months ac the tecen~io~ ~e~ter, a~d so we

22

\-J~uld ask the C,::1;rt

24

addressed in the district court.

25

attorney over there.

His family does have limited means.

t.-::.

He's already been

c.-:.nsider lc-wei-5.H•~ his bail amount.

He'll be assigned a new

I don't know how long that will take for

• : ;4, ··~

.It•,,

I._, ·~>
- t
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him,

2

potentially bail him out,

3

exclusive for them.

4

THE COURT:

Do you have a request?

5

MS. ELLIS:

I would request 20,000.

6

THE COURT:

Thank you.

7

MR. BRAY:

so I would like to have his family have the ability to
and I think $60,000 is very, very

They're not going to be able to do that.

Your Honor,

Counsel?
similar to Ms. Ellis's argument,

8

CVH has been held for quite some time.

9

sure we were going to address the bail here.

The issue -- I wasn't
I would ask the

10

Court to consider a reduction of bail at this time as well.

11

know that in the district court there's opportunities.

12

think it's a case of being released on own recognizance, but we

13

do have other resources.

14

probation officer that would monitor them until we get to that

15

point.

16

Your Honor,

I don't

We have pre-trial services or a

consider reducing it to 20,000 just for the one count -- or

18

(inaudible) 20,000 bail at this time,

19

(inaudible) we can get in even with the arrest warrant.

20

going to be transferred to the county jail,

22

1. t:

di&trirt court,

25

your Honor.

I'm not sure
They're

is my understanding,

h?. s r, ' t be e r, f i J -s d y P

i.

j_ r~ -..: •~,

we would ask the Courc

the bail to 20,000 in this case,
THE COURT:

Thank you.

~u

t h~

reduce -- or reduce

your Honor.
Does anyone from the county

:~
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s~ as to addressing~ release to pre-trial

Sbrvices or ba1i,

24

.•

we'd ask the Court if the Court would

17

21

I do

..·,, ;·:;:-•'f
"}i{~:

-1391

attorney's office know when this would be heard by a district

2

court judge?

3

MS. TOOMBS:

Yes,

your Honor.

The two adult defendants

4

are assigned to me.

5

next calendar date for them is January 8 th •

6

holding a calendar on December 30 th at 2 o'clock, but of course

7

our preference would be to have all five of the co-defendants

8

together on January 8~.

9

THE COURT:

They are assigned to Judge Jones, and the

Okay.

Judge Jones is

In terms of being able to get in

10

front of the district court judge for purposes of bail, would

11

there be a video arraignment or some opportunity to get in front

12

of a district court judge?

13

MS. TOOMBS:

Your Honor, I would believe chat when they

14

are booked into the Weber County Jail that they do appear on

15

videos because the district court will first hear of them that

16

way.

17

THE COURT:

18

sure what the procedure was.

Thank you.

19

$40,000 bail in this matter.

We'll set it over to the district

20

court.

Okay.

That was my thought, but I wasn't
All right.

I'm setting

My guess is that you're going to be in front -- at least

21

!s there a~ythlnry else -- are there &ny questions

24
25

that Counsel have with regard to clarification of my order?

MR. FLINT:

I don't have any,

your Honor.

... ").
1_,j'tb
.
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MS. ELLIS:

2

MR. BRAY:

3

THE COURT:

No,

your Honor.

No, your Honor.
Thank you.

Mr. Flint,

I'm instructing the

4

county attorney's office to prepare the findings and the order in

5

this matter, since you were the prevailing party.

6

all of you.

Thank you.

7

MR. BRAY:

8

MS. ELLIS:

9

Good luck to

Thank you,

your Honor.

Your Honor, with the arrest warrants, are

they now going to be transferred to the Weber County Jail?

10

THE COURT:

They are.

11

MS. ELLIS:

Okay.

12

(Hearing concluded)

.
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Omnibus Ruling & Order on Defendant's Post-Sentence Motions
(R586-97)
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Addendum F

•

•
•

•

IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

i-----------

vs.

Case No. 1319025

COOPER JOHN ANTHONY VAN

Judge Ernie W. Jo es

HUIZEN.

•

OMNIBUS RULING AND
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S
POST-SENTENCE MOTIONs\UG 2 9 2014

Defendant.

~ILED

I AUG ~9 20;_]
, SECOND
DISTRICT COURT

This matter is before the Court on Defendanfs several post-sentence

•
•

motions. In order, Defendant has presented the Court with the following motions:

.1) the "Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed Illegally as a Result of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel"; 2) the "Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious
Youth Offender Bindover Order"; 3) the "Motion to Declare Misple~s or Nullify
Pleas"; 4) the "Motion to Quash Bindover Order from Juvenile Court"; and 5) a

•

"Motion for Stay of Sentence Pending Appeal" combined with an "Application for
Ce1iificate of Probable Cause." Counsel for both the State and Defendant have

•

fully briefed these motions and the Court has carefully considered the arguments
and law cited therein. In the interest of judicial efficiency, and as these motions

•

•

touch on similar themes and legal questions, the Court will address these motions
in this single omnibus ruling and order.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Omnibus Ruling and Order on Defendant's Post-Sentence Motions
Civil No. 131902542
Page 2 of 13

BACKGROUND

•
•

Defendant, following his participation in a violent home invasion, was
charged with two counts of aggravated robbery and one count of aggravated
burglary. Defendant, a 16-year-old minor, was then bound over from juvenile court
to this Court to face the charges as an adult. The bind over process was conducted
in accordance with the Juvenile Court Act, specifically its provisions relating to

•

•

serious youth offenders See Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. In March of this year,
. Defendant entered guilty pleas to two reduced, second-degree felony robbery

•

charges. On May 7, 2014, Defendant was sentenced to two concurrent 1- to 15-

•

year terms in the Utah State Prison.
Defendant, by raising several alleged deficiencies, now seeks to challenge
the process by which Defendant was bound over into district court from juvenile
court, entered his plea of guilty, and a sentence was imposed. In deciding these

•

motions, the Court will address each motion according to its chronological relation
to Defendant's proceedings, rather than in the order that Defendant filed the

•

motion with the Court. Following the Court's analysis and ruling, the Court will
specify its respective orders.

ANALYSIS

I.

Motion to Quash Bind Over Order from Juvenile Court
First, the Court addresses Defendant's motion to quash the bind over order

from juvenile court. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by several alleged
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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•
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Omnibus Ruling and Order on Defendant's Post-Sentence Motions
Civil No. 131902542
Page 3 of 13

legal and structural errors that occurred during the process by which the juvenile
court bound him over to this Court. The statutory mechanisms establishing this

•
•

bind over process are outlined below.
The Juvenile Court Act, specifically in its provisions relating to transferring
serious youth offenders to district court, provides that juveniles may be bound over
and held to answer to as adults in district court if the criminal information filed
against those juveniles charges them with certain types of violent offenses. See

•

Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702. This process is not automatic and is subject to the
state meeting its burden to establish probable cause that that the violent offense has

•

been committed and that the juvenile defendant committed said violent offense .

•

"shall order that the defendant be bound over [to the district court] ... unless the

Utah Code Ann. §78A-6-702(3). If the state met this burden, the juvenile court

juvenile court judge finds that it would be contrary to the best interest of the minor
and to the public .... " Id .

•

The factors that a juvenile court judge may rely upon in making the
determination to bind over the defendant are very specific, and the Juvenile Court

•

A.ct provid.e:-J that a juvenile defendant may appeal a bind over order.. Sec tJi:ah
Code A.nn. 78A-·6-702(3)(c), ?8A-6-704(a). On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals

•

then reviews the bind over order and the "underlying factual findings made by the
juvenile judge" for "clear error)' in order to determine whether to affirm or reverse
the bind over order. State ex rel. M.E.P., 114 P.3d 596, 598 (Utah Ct. App. 2005) .

•
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This process illustrates that it is only the appellate court that is vested with

•

the authority to consider and potentially quash juvenile bind over orders.
Defendant has offered sundry arguments as to why this Court should quash the

•

bind ov·er order, but such arguments to this Court are unavailing, as it possesses no
jurisdiction to issue the particular relief sought. Only the appellate court may
consider these arguments and order the bind over order quashed if that court

•

determines that such action is appropriate. For lack of jurisdiction, this Court

•

cannot grant such a motion.
II.

Motion to Reinstate Appeal of Right from Serious Youth Bind over
Order

The Court now turns to Defendant's motion to reinstate the timeframe to

•

appeal the bind over order. Defendant argues that he was prejudiced by the failure
of then-serving counsel to timely file an appeal of the bind over order and the

•

failure of same counsel to inform Defendant of the availability of such an appeal.
Defendant cites the Utah Supreme Court case State v. Manning in support of the
proposition fhat it is appropriate to reinstate appellate time when appeals of right
, t·· 1 , i-0y counsel.- a.no.' tnrougu
1
t..
f"'.
. ue:i.:en' ,. d ant ,:-,ee ;:itate v.
are oe.:,uJ.ea.
no 1ault
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r-;

·• ' ,. "l')'
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1,iVJ·.·~•
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....• ;:.)I),)
..:>0.tc:;")
~~-o,

,;'lC (l.]'·l o.·t•200r-,
i. J )·

\,.J O 1,.

0

•·1·1·-le.-J.;_,,,,P:
o-··~.
,'
0,ta:L, ai:::,.t.
~,ea

' lL.,
'· c
l.D.

•

,...,

·
"':
·
opp001ng

•

memorandum that under Manning, Defendant should have his time to appeal the
bind over order reinstated.
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•

Manning provides that it is appropriate to reinstate a Defendant's direct
appeal right if it can be determined that the defendant "been prevented in some

•
•

meaningful way from proceeding with a first appeal of right." Id. at 635. One of
the outlined circumstances of Manning leading to reinstatement of the direct appeal
right is that the defendant can demonstrate that "the court or the defendant's
attorney failed to properly advise defendant of the right to appeal." Id. While the
State points out that the juvenile court bind over order clearly specified the 30-day

•

right to appeal that order, Defendant maintains that his counsel neither informed
the Defendant of this fact nor provided the Defendant with a copy of the bind over

•

order .
Normally a guilty plea, such as Defendant's here, would serve as a waiver of

•

any alleged procedural defects with the bind over. See State v. Rhinehart, 167 P.3d
1046, 1049 (Utah 2007). However, our Supreme Court has specified that this
waiver does apply to alleged errors of a jurisdictional nature. Id. Here, had

•

Defendant timely appealed the bind over order, he would have been challenging
1.
t11e

e

dec1s1on
. . o f tl1.e Juveru
.
·1 e court 'w comer
.c
•
• d'1ct10n
. over tni. e D
cdant t..o t.h"1s
Juns
_ e1en

CourL This question,,. cor.obinf;d v,rith the fact thai: Defendant h.as offered evidence
supporting the application of the )Wanning circumstances (namely that counsel

•

failed to advise Defendant of his right to appeal and failed to provide him with the
juvenile court order specifying the available relief) lez.d.s the Court to conclude that

reinstating Defendant's time to appeal the bind over order is appropriate .

•
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The Court, however, must stress that granting Defendant's motion here does

•
•

not affect Defendant's present incarceration, as the Court's decision cannot unwind
all proceedings post-bind over order. When this Court heard the case, accepted the
plea, and announced a sentence, it did so with the understanding that it held proper

•

jurisdiction via bind over order. Barring an appellate court decision as to the
validity of that bind over order and its effect on this Court's sentence, the Court

•

lacks the authority to stay the sentence in conjunction with reinstating the time to
appeal the bind over order. The appropriate procedural mechanism to stay a

•

sentence pending appeal is found in Rule 27 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure. As mentioned in the outset of this ruling, Defendant has made a motion
invoking that rule, and the Court will address the merits of that motion later in this
ruling.

Ill

Motion to Declare Mispleas or Nullify Pleas

•

•

Next the Court addresses Defendant's motion that this Court recognize
Defendant's guilty pleas as mispleas or alternatively to nullify those guilty pleas.

•

Defendant asserts that this Court retains the authority to declare a misplea here or

to rn.JJ.Iit~1 his pl.eas bec2.'l.rne the guilty pleas ·were not ln1ovving or voluntary. V1/hile
it 1s i:rue that a triai court may withd.rmv a plea of guilty upon a showing that the

plea was not lmowingly or voluntarily made, such motions must be made prior t o
the announcement of sentence. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(a)-(b). Any
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challenge to a guilty plea "not made within the [specified] time period" can only be
pursued via request for post-conviction relief. Utah Code Ann. §77-13-6(2)(c ).

•

Here, the Court has announced its sentence regarding the Defendant's
conviction. Accordingly, the Court possesses neither the authority to hear such a
motion nor the ability to grant the requested remedy. Defendant's arguments

•

regarding knowledge, volition, and their relation to his guilty pleas may only be
offered in a separate, civil petition for post-conviction relief. The Court therefore

•

cannot grant this motion.

IV.

•

Motion to Correct Sentence Imposed Illegally as a Result of Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel
Defendant also moves this Court, pursuant to Utah Rule of Criminal

Procedure 22( e), to correct Defendant's sentence on the basis that the sentence was

•

illegal. In support of this motion, Defendant offers that the sentence was illegal
due to trial counsel's ineffective assistance at the sentencing hearing. Specifically,

•

Defendant argues that the assistance was ineffective because trial counsel failed at
the sentencing hearing to distinguish Defendanf s culpabiWy from that of his co-

defondant:,:•1 3.n.d failed to provide the Comi: (for purpo::;es of presentcnce repo;:ti:n.g)

•
Defendant's strenuous argument, ineffective assistance of counsel does not serve

•
•

as grounds for declaring a sentence illegal.
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Regarding illegal sentences, the Utah Supreme Court has adopted the

•
•

definition promulgated by the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals. State v. Yazzie, 203
P.3d 984, 988 (Utah 2009). Under that definition, a sentence is illegal if it "is
ambiguous with respect to the time and manner in which it is to be served, is
internally contradictory, omits a term required to be imposed by statute, is
uncertain as to the substance of the sentence, or is a sentence which the judgment

•
•

of conviction did not authorize." United States v. Dougherty, 106 F.3d 1514, 1515
(10th Cir.1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). As the State points out, a

•

sentence is also illegal if the imposing court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. State
v. Thorkelson, 84 P.3d 854, 857 (Utah Ct. App. 2004).

•

As the Court cannot consider Defendant's arguments of ineffective
assistance of counsel as a proper basis for declaring the sentence here illegal, it
must determine whether the any of the aforementioned, recognized grounds apply.

•

The Court determines that they do not. Defendant pled guilty to two counts of
robbery. Robbery is classified under Utah Code Annotated §76-6-301 as a second-

•

degree felony. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §76-3-203 , the appropriate

r -, -~- ,~- not.'- 1es..,
-; Q -L·-ha1.1
,. . one
·· _:., )--,. eai.
. · .,. , x1.01. .~." 111.c,1
,. _ . . . t,, ·~:..l--ian·- 1__ _)t;..
,1.11111ue~~u1.uw.t.i;:; u~uIJ. u1 JL1]JJ.1somnen,
r ~-

:._ ,..:,

.:.

·- -~i : ...

,.. ..!.•

r.::., ··· - --...,,,. ,,..

r -J-: -v --- ... ~

years." Utah Code Ann. §76--3-203(2). Defendant's sentence here was not
ambiguous with respect to time or manner. It was not intem8lly contradictory. It

•
•

did not omit a required terrn imposed by statute. It was not uncertain as to the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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substance of the sentence. It was precisely the sort of sentence authorized by the
conviction of a second-degree felony. As previously established, the Court had

•

jurisdiction subsequent to the issuance of the bind over order from juvenile court .
None of the established grounds that would render a sentence illegal and require
correction under Rule 22(e) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure exist here .

•

Accordingly, the Court can find no basis to properly grant Defendant's motion.

V.

•

Motion to Stay Sentence Pending Appeal and Issue a Certificate of
Probable Cause
Finally, the Court addresses Defendant's petition for a certificate of probable

cause motion to his Motion to stay his sentence pending appeal. In order to release

•

a currently incarcerated defendant during the pendency of his appeal, Rule 27 of
the Utah Rule of Criminal Procedure requires that that this Court first issue a

•
•

certificate of probable cause and determine by clear and convincing evidence that
the defendant is not likely to flee and does not pose a danger to the community.

Utah R. Crim. P. 27(b)(l). In order to properly issue a certificate of probable
cause, the Court must find that the Defendant's appeal is not taken for the purpose

•
Out of the myriad arguments Defendant has made, the Court has recognized
•

only one as cognizant: that the Defendant may appeal the juvenile Court bind over
order due to the failure of trial counsel to apprise him of his right to appeal the

•
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order. However, this Court is not convinced by Defendant' s arguments that it is

•
•

reasonably likely that the Court of Appeals will quash the bind over order.
Furthermore, on the basis of the clearly delineated jurisprudence that informs the

•

Court's analysis of Defendant's other motions, the Court is not convinced that
Defendant has raised any substantial issues of law and fact that make it reasonably
likely that the Court of Appeals will overturn the Court's other determinations.

•

Specifically as to the bind over order, Defendant's argument challenges the
juvenile court judge's qualifications to hear his case and only collaterally attacks

•

the juvenile court's consideration of the five factors that must be analyzed when
deciding to bind over a defendant to district court. As stated previously, the

•

statutory provisions of Utah Code Annotated 78A-6-702(3)(c) require that juvenile
court judges only consider five specific factors when making bind over
determinations. Nothing in Defendant' s arguments suggests that the juvenile court

•

deviated from those factors and none ofDefendanf s proffered alternative
conclusions to each of those factors is legally or factuall.y significant enough to call

•

the courf s decision into question.

•
regarding the juveniie cou1t judge (specifically her personal and profossionoJ
background) raise an issue of fact or law significant enough to make reversal of th e
bind over reasonably certain. As the Court can find no 2.dequ.atl"; ground on thi:::

issue, or as to the arguments supporting Defendant's other post-sentence motions,
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that would warrant the issuance of a certificate of probable cause, the Court will
refrain from issuing such a certificate.

•
•

Even if the Court were to find a basis to issue the certificate of probable
cause, the circumstances forming the basis of Defendant's conviction demonstrate
that it is not in the community's best interest to release him from incarceration .
The Defendant is serving his current sentence because he pled guilty to robbery-a
robbery accomplished through home invasion and through Defendant's provision

•

of firearms. These are actions and the sort of behavior that can only be
characterized as absolutely contrary to the societal interests of peace and safety.

•
•

Defendant's age does not mitigate the gravity of these actions. Indeed, the
severity of his behavior warranted charging him in district court as an adult. It
would be antithetical to the interests-even safety--of the community to suspend
the operation of his sentence. Absent grounds to issue a certificate of probable
cause, and in light of the circumstances of the offense, the Court is not convinced

•

that it is appropriate to release defendant from incarceration.

ORDER~

•
Appeal of IZight from Serious Youth Bindover Ordtr is i-3,hJU~TED. All other

•

motions captioned and discussed herein are hereby DE.N1ED. In accordance with
granting Defendant's Motion to Reinstate Appea] of Right fro m. Serious Y01-1.tb_
Bindover Order, the 30--day period to appeal the bind over order is reinstated.

•

- .• i. : /,;-•
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Pursuant to Rule 4(f) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, any such appeal of

•

that bind over order must be filed within 30 days of the entry of this Order.
Dated this :i ~ day of

--

'

A

v<-oi, v\:>T2014.
\

1~<1,,--r---Judge Ernie W. Jones
\
Utah Second District Court

•
•

•
•

•
•

•
•
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

a, ....

.7()~.
,,-1-1 hereby certify that on the _&J_ day of_~-~'----+--2014, I sent a true and correct
copy of the foregoing ruling to the parties as follows:

•

•

•

Dee W. Smith
Brody E. Flint
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Weber County Attorney's Office
2380 Washington Blvd., Ste 230
Ogden, Utah 84401

Elizabeth Hunt
Attorney for Defendant
Elizabeth Hunt LLC
569 Browning Ave.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84105
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ADDENDUMG

Chart of text messages
(from State's Exhibit 1)
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AddendumG

Text Messages Recovered From
Joshua Dutson's Phone
3 November 2013

Defendant & Dutson

Time

Inc01ning
(from Defendant)

Skinner & Dutson
Incoming
(from Skinner)

Outgoing
(to Defendant)

Outgoing
(to Skinner)

I

Rob some niggas
Hahahahah
no what I'm
saying?
Want in you'll
get a cut of it?
Hahahaha

10:03

Then we take
that.
But yeah I'll do
that for sure I
just gotta get my
gun back from
anddrew.

10:04

I
I
I

That's hella chill
nigga but J was
kidding

'

I
I

~:-f'

: 10:06

JK I'm mot

---

------·---- ------------ I - - - - ~ - - - -

i

i

tn7

Not what? Ha
·n 11.US.l.,
i: ·i , er ~h
,
7 •.. C

, l.

,

"

o''

- -- -

'

i

._j

------!

;
'

: shit outa me
!

. ·---

L,kc that shit'
gimme hid
number!

I 1008 I
- - ~ - ~ - - - - - - __]_

~-

_________~
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I

Time

Defendant & Dutson
Incoming
(from Defendant)

Skinner & Dutson
Incon1ing
(from Skinner)

Outgoing
(to Defendant)

Outgo:ing
(to Skinner)

I

Im high
hahaHaha
you can be apart
of it but you
gotta keep it on
the down low ..
an trust no nigga
He want to help
rob nigga

10:09

About what?
Robbing or
driving the
mustang?

10:10

I know
I' rn not dumb
hahaaha!

I

I
Haha

10:12

Tomorrow we
grab them straps
and hit up
niggas
r-----

10:14
i'

'

!

I
I

:

1
I

I \i\Tha t time we
-------

I
i

I

lcavinrr0

----

I

-

-·

Fasho 1

--

I

' 10:15
'

i

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _J_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _~

"T-7-,sl-o"
le,_ l

:s
-Ia1-a
f.-1·
l::,
10 1v

"(01·
-L11· c.
l
:,
0

"

R76G
'\._ -·
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Time

Defendant & Dutson
Incoming
(from Defendant)

Skinner & Dutson
Incoming
(from Skinner)

Outgoing
(to Defendant)

Outgoing
(to Skinner)

Like 11 or when
ever Dexter
[Skinner] wants
us to .. But I have
to bring the car
10:16
home at 2:15
cause I'm not
supposed to chill
with anyone
tomorrow
Okay that's chill.
An Kyra says
7:45

She wants to got
10:18 to Dexters that
early
Yeah Haha so we
can get the lick

10:19

We going
through nigga ha

10:20
Say wah?

We gonna go
through?

10:21
tho .. Mv dad's
10:22 not gunna leave
tell almost 8
.I

-~•-•·--·

:

I
I

.' \A/ell shit..·---------1
Haha

~·········- · · · · · · - · - · · - ~ - · · • · -

okau

.____._______.__._______.[ I

I
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Time

Defendant & Dutson

Incoming
(from Defendant)

Outgoing
(to Defendant)

Skinner & Dutson

Incoming
(from Skinner)

That's what's up
ma nigga much
lovefamhum
tomorrow

10:23

10:25

Outgoing
(to Skinner)

Pasho
much love
family
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5 November 2013
@

Dutson & Defendant

Time

Incoming
(from Defendant)

Wanna hit up a
lick today

1:44

1:45

Outgoing
(to Defendant)

No I can't
anymore my dad
is coming home

1:46

Later? Not now
How later?

1:47
1:48

Idk like 7-8
Maybe .. I'll hit u
up later
Cool
The little white
boys we hit up

2:07

Hahah
2:08

He hitting them
again
Ur

Jk Haha Imhigh
@

@

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

